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Statutory Interpretation, Property Rights, and Boundaries: The
Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark Dilution, Trade
Dress, and Product Configuration Cases
by Gary Myers'
The scope and limits of intellectual property rights, unlike rights in real and
personal property, are often difficult to define or ascertain. This problem, which in
its general contours has frequently been recognized and debated, presents a
particularly serious challenge in present times because courts and legislatures are
broadly interpreting or expanding the subject matter of intellectual property rights.
Intellectual property is playing a growing role as businesses in the service,
information, and technology fields become increasingly important to our economy.
This form of growth is unsurprising and probably desirable. At the same time,
however, the traditional rules governing particular areas of intellectual property are
in flux. For example, in patent law, parties are now successfully seeking patent
claims on "business methods", which were previously thought by many to be
ineligible for patent protection.' In the right of publicity arena, some courts are
interpreting state common law rights of publicity to allow potential relief for imitators
who merely conjure up the images of celebrities.2
The growth of intellectual property litigation is perhaps nowhere more dramatic
than in trademark law. The two areas in which trademark claims have dramatically
increased in the last decade are in the protection of trade dress and in the doctrine of
Visiting Professor of Law, College of William & Mary; Professor of Law, University of
Mississippi. I wish to thank the participants at the William & Mary faculty colloquium for their
comments, and Lauren MacLanahan and Meredith Messer Lackey for their helpful research assistance.
Copyright 0 2000 by Gary Myers.
1. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375- 77 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (holding that language and structure of Patent Act do not support "business methods"
exception, and therefore that business methods are subject to the same analysis as any patent subject
matter). As Robert Merges suggests, for better or worse, change is afoot in patent law (as it is in
trademark law as well, one might note):
"Now I'll give you something to believe" [the White Queen remarked.] "I'mjust one hundred and
one, five months and a day." "I can't believe that!" said Alice. "Can't you?" the Queen said in
a pitying tone. "Try again, draw a long breath and shut your eyes." Alice laughed. "There's no
use trying," she said, "one can't believe impossible things." "I daresay you haven't had much
practice," said the Queen. "When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why
sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."
The White Queen would be right at home in the U.S. patent system today. First software, once thought
too purely mathematical, and now business "methods" or concepts, once thought too abstract, have
become perfectly acceptable subject matter for patents. For better or for worse, whole new landscapes
have been opened to the possibility of patents. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents
Before Breakfast: Property Rights For Business Concepts andPatent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 577 (1999).
2. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 951 (1994).
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trademark dilution. The expansion in the trade dress field stems in substantial part
from the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.3
In this landmark case, the Supreme Court addressed whether the trade dress of a
restaurant is protectable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act if it is deemed to be
inherently distinctive, even absent proof of secondary meaning. 4 At trial, the jury
found that the plaintiff was the owner of non-functional trade dress in its restaurant,
that the trade dress was inherently distinctive, and that no secondary meaning had
been established. The Court held that there was no textual basis in the Lanham Act
for treating trade dress in a manner different from other types of trademarks. Thus,
the Court agreed that the trade dress in question could be analyzed under the
traditional spectrum of distinctiveness, as would any mark, and is protectable if it has
inherent or, in the case of descriptive trade dress has acquired distinctiveness. The
Court reaffirmed, however, that only non-functional trade dress features are eligible
for trademark protection.
With regard to the substantive impact of trademark dilution theory, traditionally
a trademark owner was required to prove a likelihood of confusion in order to obtain
relief under federal or state trademark law. In other words, the trademark plaintiff
was required to prove that the defendant's use of a mark was "likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person. " In practical effect, the requirement of proof of
confusion meant that weak trademarks were given limited protection, dissimilar
marks were not barred from use even in the same product or service market, and that
the trademark claim was less likely to succeed if a similar mark was being used in a
particular product or service market that was far removed from the plaintiff's market.
In the large majority of cases, this standard worked a desirable balance between the
rights of trademark owners and the rights of those who wished to use what for lack
of a better term could be called non-confusingly similar marks.
There were some instances, however, in which the result under this standard might
be undesirable. The classic hypothetical examples are "DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin
tablets, Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, [and] Bulova gowns.6" In each of these
instances, even though the ordinary consumer would not be confused- i.e., would not
believe that the plaintiff trademark owner was the source or sponsor of the
3. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). The Court defined trade dress as follows: "The 'trade dress' of a product
is essentially its total image and overall appearance. It involves the total image of a product and may
include features such as size, shape, coloror color combinations, texture, graphics, oreven particularsales
techniques." Id at 764 n. I (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966,980 (11 th
Cir. 1983)).
4. "Secondary meaning is used generally to indicate that a mark or dress 'has come through use
to be uniquely associated with a specific source.' 'To establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must
show that, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify
the source of the product ratherthan the product itself."' Id. at 766 n.4 (quoting lnwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n. II (1982)).
5. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(a)(1)(A)(1994). This section 43(a) standard is fairly similar to the standard
for infringement of registered trademarks and to the common law unfair competition standard.
6. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,1031 (2d Cir. 1989)
(quoting 1954 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 49-50).
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defendant's goods or services - there was still some damage done to the distinctive
quality of the plaintiff's brand name. Over time, if these uses were allowed, the term
"Kodak" would no longer automatically bring to mind the maker of film and other
photographic products. To address this problem, many states enacted trademark
dilution statutes, which allowed relief when a distinctive or famous trademark was
blurred or tarnished by the use of a substantially similar or identical mark, even in the
absence of a showing of consumer confusion or direct competition in the plaintiff's
market. In late 1995, Congress enacted the federal Trademark Dilution Act, which
made the dilution doctrine a matter of federal trademark law.
Since 1995, courts have struggled to interpret the meaning and scope of the
Trademark Dilution Act, just as they had previously struggled with the state dilution
statutes, which were found in more than half of the states. Although the Trademark
Dilution Act offered some promise of uniform federal treatment of trademark dilution
claims, it too has become a classic illustration of the "boundaries" problem in
intellectual property law. Courts have had difficulty in determining which trademarks
are eligible for protection from dilution. They have also struggled with the standard
for infringement, which requires determining what dilution means, and what it is not.
They have struggled in determining what defenses or limits exist on the scope of
dilution claims.
Litigation concerning the subject matter and extent of protection available for
trademarks and trade dress has increased considerably in recent years, particularly as
trademark owners have become aware of the broad range of features that can be
protected as trade dress and of the generous protections that the Supreme Court
accorded to trade dress in Two Pesos. Similarly, there has been an increase in
litigation regarding dilution claims. The following table illustrates the dramatic
nature of the increase in both areas. The chart shows reported decisions in which
substantial trade dress or trademark dilution claims were presented, whether under
federal or state law or both.7





It is not surprising that litigation in these fields has increased, as parties test the
boundaries and limits of trade dress and dilution claims.
There is no complete solution to the line-drawing problem in trade dress and
trademark dilution cases. There will always be uncertainty as to the scope of
protection available for trade dress and as to whether a trademark has been
impermissibly diluted, as there has been under the likelihood of confusion standard.
7. The search was conducted using Westlaw and was limited to reported decisions that presented
trade dress questions of sufficient substance to warrant mention in the Westlaw headnotes and synopsis.
It is intended only as a rough measure of the growth in litigation in these fields.
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It is clear from the case law and commentary that there is a need for limiting
principles in these cases. These limiting principles should, however, be consistent
with the language and purpose of the Lanham Act and the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act, with the common law, and with Supreme Court precedent in the field
of trademarks in particular and intellectual property in general.
This article therefore suggests that any trademark doctrines used to address and
perhaps limit the expansion of trademark law must comport with three fundamental
rules of interpretation. First, courts must look to the plain language of the Lanham
Act and the Trademark Dilution Act. Although this point may appear to be obvious,
courts and commentators have in many instances ignored important limiting language
in these statutes or have suggested interpretive approaches that are plainly inconsis-
tent with the text or overall structure of these statutes. Second, in cases of ambiguity
or where the statutes do not address the question presented, courts should take into
consideration the common law background and overall statutory context in which
these laws must operate. By drawing upon traditional common law principles and
structural guideposts in trademark and unfair competition law, courts can reach
reasoned conclusions regarding some of the uncertainties raised by the expansion of
trademark law. A third interpretive method, which in many ways is derived from the
first two, is to assess the Supreme Court's reasoning in intellectual property cases
generally, including but not limited to other trademark cases, and to apply that
reasoning to delineate the boundaries of trademark protection. Only if these doctrinal
constraints prove to be insufficient will the ultimate limits~on trademark law may
come into consideration, either as a result of the interplay between trademark and
patent policy or as a matter of substantive constitutional limits on Congress' Article
I power to regulate the field.
In suggesting this paradigm for analyzing trademark questions, this article does not
purport to develop a new theory of statutory interpretation in general, or even a new
approach to trademark cases. It is striking, however, how rarely lower courts and
commentators have focused on methods of interpretation in resolving the difficult
questions presented by the expansion of trademark law in the last decade. Thus, the
purpose of this article is to apply the approach the Supreme Court has used in such
cases as Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,8 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co.,9 and Park N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.' to some of the knotty
questions in the areas of trade dress and trademark dilution. The article also takes
into account the Supreme Court's recently announced decision in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc." This approach will not be helpful in resolving all
unsettled questions in these areas, but it can move the debate toward the truly vexing
areas of concern.
The approach suggested here is by no means the only plausible one. Some would
suggest a resort to legislative history, which unfortunately is relatively sparse,
8. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
9. 514 U.S. 159(1995).
10. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
11. 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
[23:3/4
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particularly with regard to the scope of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.'2 Some
would have Congress amend the Lanham Act and revise or repeal the Trademark
Dilution Act.'3 This article, however, takes the view that the basic landscape in
trademark law is unlikely to change in the near future. Congress has only recently
enacted the Trademark Dilution Act, and there seems to be little movement to amend
it dramatically, let alone repeal it. There have been several recently enacted
amendments to the Lanham Act addressing functionality that make great sense and
are consistent with the principles suggested here, as will be discussed below.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Two Pesos, Qualitex, Park 'n 'Fly, and Samara has
recently set forth rules that will allow trade dress claims to be asserted with
considerable success. Thus, this article takes no position on the question of whether
trade dress or dilution law is a good thing in principle. Rather, it suggests ways in
which trade dress and dilution law can be constrained in a manner that allows
legitimate claims to proceed while at the same time delineating workable boundaries
and limits on the scope of these theories.
This article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of the proposed interpretive method
for resolving some of the boundary problem in trademark law. Part II describes the
growth in protection for trade dress and applies the suggested interpretive method to
define the nature and extent of protection for trade dress, including product
configurations. The principal doctrinal constraints are the doctrine of functionality,
the requirement of distinctiveness or secondary meaning, and the requirement of
consumer confusion. Part III briefly addresses the history and enactment of the
Trademark Dilution Act, highlights the boundary problems that have developed in
trademark dilution cases, and suggests some solutions, focusing on limiting the scope
of marks covered by the Trademark Dilution Act, defining the test for dilution more
carefully, and recognizing the statutory defenses and limits on dilution claims. Part
IV addresses the interplay between trade dress and dilution protection. It is in this
area that trademark law faces its greatest challenge. The analytical approach
proposed here provides a method of identifying cases in which a "trade dress
dilution" claim can be asserted. Such claims will be rare and carefully identified
under this approach, thus avoiding some if not all cases in which trade dress dilution
claims might be viewed as providing the equivalent of a perpetual design or utility
patent for product configurations. The central point of this article is that courts
should be guided by the essential nature of marks as source indicators and informa-
tion signifiers. By following this approach, courts can set defensible boundaries on
trademark claims while at the same time protecting the legitimate interests of
trademark owners.
12. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant is Now Wide Awake, 59
LAW & CONTEmP. PkoBs., Spring 1996, at 45, 46 (noting the dearth of legislative history in connection
with section 43(a), under which most trade dress cases have been litigated).
13. See infra notes 186-49 & 199 and accompanying text.
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1. BOUNDARIES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
A PROPOSED APPROACH FOR TRADEMARKS
Trademark principles can be derived from three main sources. The first and most
important source is the language and structure of the Lanham Act and the Trademark
Dilution Act. These statutory sources, in cases where they are clear, control the
determination of the boundaries of trademark protection. Second, any interpretation
to be used in a trade dress or trademark dilution case should be consistent with the
approach the Supreme Court has used in its recent trademark decisions, and with the
Court's approach in intellectual property cases generally. Third, courts should look
to the common law background of unfair competition and trademark law and to the
overarching purposes the Lanham Act and the Trademark Dilution Act.
A. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE
The language and structure of the Lanhan Act and Trademark Dilution Act should
be the starting point in the analysis of any trademark question, just as courts generally
should refer to the text of a statute as the starting point for interpretation. 4 "There is,
of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by
which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.' Thus, for
example, the Supreme Court in Park 'N Fly interpreted the Lanham Act's
incontestability provisions to preclude a "descriptiveness" defense when the
plaintiff's mark is incontestable. The statutes listed the specific grounds upon which
an incontestable mark remains open to challenge, which did not include descriptive-
ness.
As a general matter, the Lanham Act is written in broad and sweeping terms and
suggests that marks should generally be analyzed in the same manner regardless of
their type. A trademark is defined as follows: "A 'trademark' includes any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof" used by any person "to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufac-
tured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown." 6 Under section 1052, "[n]o mark by which the goods of the applicant
may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the
principal nature on account of its nature" unless certain clearly specified prohibitions
and limitations come into play. 7 The Court recognized this point in Two Pesos. The
Trademark Dilution Act, in particular, specifically addresses several interpretive
questions, and courts should pay close attention to the language of that statute. The
Supreme Court's recent decisions in the trademark area, which are discussed in the
14. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103,108 (1990); K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281,291 (1988); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). See also Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,571-74 (1982) (discussing importance, in descending order, of language,
structure, and lastly legislative history).
i5. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
16. 15 U.S.C. § '1127 (1994).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994).
[23:3/4
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next section, provide further guidance on the use of statutory principles in trademark
cases.
B. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: THE TRADEMARK DECISIONS
The Supreme Court has decided four landmark cases involving trademark law in
the last fifteen years. This article will make use of these decisions - Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. " Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 9 Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Products Co.,2" and Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.21 - to
provide a conceptual approach to trade dress and dilution questions and perhaps to
provide boundaries for trademark claims that should resolve most of the concerns
regarding the field's recent expansion. In Two Pesos, the Court granted certiorari to
address "whether the trade dress of a restaurant may be protected under § 43(a) of the
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), based on a finding of inherent distinctiveness,
without proof that the trade dress has secondary meaning."' Taco Cabana operated
Mexican fast-food restaurants in Texas. Its trade dress consisted of"a festive eating
atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright
colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior and exterior areas with the
interior patio capable of being sealed off from the outside patio by overhead garage
doors. The stepped exterior of the building is a festive and vivid color scheme using
top border paint and neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the
theme."' Two Pesos entered the Texas market later, opening restaurants that were
deliberately and strikingly similar to the overall appearance of a Taco Cabana
location. Taco Cabana brought suit. The jury addressed five specific issues and
found that Taco Cabana had ownership of trade dress in its restaurants, that the trade
dress was not functional, that it was inherently, and that the defendant had caused a
likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source or association of the restaurants'
goods and services. Thus, the defendant was found liable for trademark infringement,
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.24
The Court granted certiorari to address a split in the circuits concerning whether
trade dress could be found to be inherently distinctive, as could any ordinary word or
symbolic trademark. This approach would allow protection without any showing of
secondary meaning. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, some circuits had held that unregistered
marks, including trade dress, were protectable only upon a showing of secondary
meaning.25 The Court held that inherently distinctive trade dress is in fact protectable
under section 43(a) without a showing that it has acquired secondary meaning. The
18. 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
19. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
20. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
21. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
22. 505 U.S. 763, 767 (1992).
23. Id. at 765 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir.
1991)).
24. Id at 765-67.
25. See, e.g., Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 198 1), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
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Court noted that "the Lanham Act was intended to make'actionable the deceptive and
misleading use of marks' and 'to protect persons engaged in... commerce against
unfair competition."' 6  The Court observed that "[m]arks are often classified in
categories of generally increasing distinctiveness." As set forth by Judge Friendly in
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., marks may be (1) generic; (2)
descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.2" Significantly, the Court
noted that the use of these classifications was not disputed by the parties. 2 Under
traditional trademark law, of course, the last three of these categories are deemed
inherently distinctive, while descriptive marks are protected only upon a showing of
secondary meaning, and generic terms are not protectable under any circumstances.
Addressing the central question of whether trade dress should be analyzed
differently than other marks for purposes of protectability, the Court found that
"[t]here is no persuasive reason to apply to trade dress a general requirement of
secondary meaning which is at odds with the principles generally applicable to
infringement suits under § 43(a)."" The Court noted that inherently distinctive
trademarks are unique and have built-in informational value, even absent any
evidence of further consumer recognition. To require proof of secondary meaning
in the case of inherently distinctive trade dress would, the Court observed, make the
trade dress vulnerable to usurpation until and unless it attains that level of actual
market recognition."
Indeed, as the Court recognized, there is no strong public interest in allowing
imitation of inherently distinctive trade dress, because by definition a wide range of
alternative trade dress options remain available. Recall again that trade dress must
also be non-functional to be protectable. Given this precondition, there is no
economic justification for allowing competitors to imitate inherently distinctive trade
dress. They can and should simply select and develop their own unique market
identity.
To hold otherwise regarding analysis of trade dress, the Court continued, would
be inconsistent with the broad language of the Lanham Act, which entitles any mark
"by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others"
to be registered and protected, unless it is otherwise precluded from registration by
other specific statutory provisions.3 Further, the plain language of the Lanham Act
allows registration and protection for inherently distinctive marks without a showing
of secondary meaning, as only descriptive marks are required to overcome this
additional hurdle:
The Fifth Circuit was quite right in Chevron, and in this case, to follow theAbercrombie
classifications consistently and to inquire whether trade dress for which protection is
claimed under § 43(a) is inherently distinctive. If it is, it is capable of identifying
26. 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992).
27. See id. (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4,9 (2d Cir. 1976)).
28. Id
29. Id at 769.
30. Id. at 770.
31. Id. (quoting 60 Stat. 428).
[23:3/4
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products or services as coming from a specific source and secondary meaning is not
required. This is the rule generally applicable to trademarks, and the protection of
trademarks and trade dress under § 43(a) serves the same statutory purpose of preventing
deception and unfair competition. There is no persuasive reason to apply different
analysis to the two. It would be a different matter if there were textual basis in § 43(a)
for treating inherently distinctive verbal or symbolic trademarks differently from
inherently distinctive trade dress. But there is none.32
Looking beyond the language of the Lanham Act, the Court proceeded to note that
allowing distinctive trade dress to be protected furthers the general purposes of the
statute, which include protecting the goodwill of producers, enabling consumers to
make informed selections from among competitors, promoting competition, and
encouraging high quality products by securing rewards for marketplace reputation.33
Thus the Court recognized the economic benefits of trademark protection and found
no reason to deny these protections in the case of distinctive trade dress. Finally, the
Court noted that imposing a requirement that secondary meaning be shown could
actually have anticompetitive effects, as smaller firms (perhaps like Taco Cabana
itself) are less likely to be able to make massive investments in obtaining the kind of
consumer recognition that would be needed to show secondary meaning. 
4
In Qualitex, the manufacturer of dry cleaning and laundry press pads sued a
competitor, alleging that the defendant's imitation of the green-gold color of the
plaintiff's pads constituted trademark infringement and unfair competition. The
plaintiff had used the color scheme since the 1950s and had obtained a federal
trademark registration for the color. The Ninth Circuit overturned a judgment for the
plaintiff on the ground that the green-gold color of the plaintiff's press pad was not
subject to trademark protection and registration. The Court thus had an opportunity
to resolve a split among the circuits concerning whether a color alone can be
registered as a trademark under the Lanham Act. It had long been established that a
color scheme could be a component of a registered trademark, such as the red and
white colors of the Coca-Cola trademark. This issue of whether a color by itself was
protectable presented a somewhat more difficult question. Justice Breyer, writing
for a unanimous Supreme Court, concluded that no special legal rule precludes color
alone from serving as trademark and that the green-gold color of a manufacturer of
32. 1d at 774.
33. Id. (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc,469 U.S. 189,198 (1985); S. Rep. No.
1333, at 3-5 (1946)).
34. Id. at 775. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment, concluding that the
language of section 43(a) and its common law background plainly supported the proposition that
inherently distinctive trade dress was protectable without a showing of secondary meaning. Id at 776
(Scalia, J., concurring); id at 785-86 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, relying on the legislative
purpose, also concurred. id at 776-85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35.. Perhaps the two most prominent prior decisions were NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d
1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1990) (case involved blue color ofNutraSweet package), which held that color alone
could not be trademarked, and In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir.
1985), which held that Owens-Coming was entitled to register the color pink for its fiberglass insulation
products.
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dry cleaning press pads could in itself be registered as a source-indicating
trademark.
36
The Court began its analysis by focusing, quite naturally, on the universe of marks
eligible for protection in light of the language of the Lanham Act and its common law
underpinnings.
The language of the Lanham Act describes that universe in the broadest of terms. It says
that trademarks "includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof." Since human beings might use as a "symbol" or "device" almost anything at
all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not restrictive.
The courts and the Patent and Trademark Office have authorized for use as a mark a
particular shape (ofa Coca-Cola bottle), a particular sound (ofNBC's three chimes), and
even a particular scent (of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread). If a shape, a sound,
and a fragrance can act as symbols why, one might ask, can a color not do the same?37
Thus, if a color alone is capable of identifying and distinguishing the trademark
owner's goods, it is eligible for registration under the Lanham Act. Significantly, the
Court noted that a color-only mark will not automatically be distinct, i.e., will not be
fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive. Once it has secondary meaning, however, a color
can have source-indicating capability, as would other descriptive marks.3 As Justice
Breyer observed, a color mark can reduce consumer search costs and provide
information in the same manner as any other type of mark.39 Protecting color marks
can encourage the creation of quality products and deter free riding by producers of
inferior goods.' Accordingly, "[it is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark -
not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign - that permits it to
serve these basic purposes."'" On the facts of the case, it was undisputed that the
plaintiff's green-gold pads did have secondary meaning and wide market recognition,
and were therefore entitled to protection. 4
2
The Court then addressed a number of possible objections to providing trademark
protection to color-only marks. The first of these is that it would allow trademark
owners to monopolize the functional aspects of a product. The Court discussed the
functionality doctrine in some detail, a discussion which will be summarized later in
this article, and concluded that this doctrine provided a sufficient bulwark against
attempts to circumvent limited-term patents and other impermissible efforts to
36. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 160-61 (1995).
37. Id at 162 (citing Registration No. 696,147 (Apr. 12, 1960); Registration Nos. 523,616 (Apr.
4, 1950) & 916,522 (July 13, 1971); In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1240 (TrAB 1990)).
38. Id. at 162-63.
39. Id at 164 (quoting I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2.01121, AT 2-3 (3D ED. 1994)).
40. Id (citing 3 L. ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES §17.03 (4th ed. 1983); Landes & Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267,271-272 (1988); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198
(1985); S. REP. No. 100-515, at 4 (1988); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 1988, at 5577, 5580.)
41. Id.
42. Id. at 166.
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trademark functional features of products.43 The Court also rejected the defendant's
argument that deciding whether a color mark has been infringed presents unusually
difficult factual issues, noting that courts are sufficiently equipped to address difficult
infringement questions and have done so in other contexts involving trademarks."
These observations have important implications for the protectability of product
configurations, which present the same doctrinal challenges. The teachings of
Qualitex are, first, that factual difficulties in applying trademark doctrine to any type
of mark must somehow be overcome directly (and not by creating a new taxonomy)
and, second, that courts must avoid the danger of protecting functional designs by
careful application of the functionality doctrine.
In Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.,4 the plaintiff operated long-term
airport parking lots under the "Park 'N Fly" name. It had registered the mark in 1969
and, pursuant to the Lanhan Act, had sought and obtained "incontestable" status upon
five years of continuous use and unchallenged (or unsuccessfully challenged)
registration.' The defendant opened a long-term airport parking services in Portland,
Oregon, using the name "Dollar Park and Fly." The plaintiff brought suit, seeking
an injunction barring the defendant's use of that name, and the defendant counter-
claimed, seeking to cancel the plaintiff's mark on the ground that it is generic or
alternatively descriptive and unenforceable.'
The lower court found that the mark was not generic and rejected the "merely
descriptive" challenge because the mark was incontestable. The Ninth Circuit
disagreed on the latter point, following its (rather nonsensical) rule that incontestabili-
ty does provide a defense against the cancellation of marks, but cannot not be used
offensively to enjoin others from using descriptive terms. The Supreme Court
disagreed and concluded that descriptiveness was not a defense of any sort in a
trademark action involving an incontestable federally registered trademark.'
Beginning with the language of the Lanham Act, the Court noted that the statute
distinguishes generic marks (which are never entitled to protection) from descriptive
ones, which are entitled to protection upon a showing of secondary meaning.
Although the statute allows a mark to be challenged on the ground that it is or has
become generic at any time, or if certain other enumerated grounds can be shown,
descriptiveness is not one of those grounds.49 The Court stated:
43. Id at 16465.
44. Id at 167 ("We do not believe, however, that color, in this respect, is special. Courts
traditionally decide quite difficult questions about whether two words or phrases or symbols are
sufficiently similar, in context, to confuse buyers. They have had to compare, for example, such words
as 'Bonamine' and 'Dramamine' (motion-sickness remedies); 'Huggies' and 'Dougies' (diapers);
'Cheracol' and 'Syrocol' (cough syrup); 'Cyclone' and 'Tornado' (wire fences); and 'Mattres' and 'I-
800-Mattres' (mattress franchisor telephone numbers).").
45. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
46. Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act states that "registration shall be conclusive evidence of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark," subject to enumerated defenses and limitations
in sections 15 and 33(b) itself. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
47. Park N'Fly, 469 U.S. at 192.
48. Id
49. Id at 194-96.
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One searches the language of the Lanham Act in vain to find any support for the
offensive/defensive distinction applied by the Court of Appeals. The statute nowhere
distinguishes between a registrant's offensive and defensive use of an incontestable
mark. On the contrary, § 33(b)'s declaration that the registrant has an "exclusive right"
to use the mark indicates that incontestable status may be used to enjoin infringement
by others. A conclusion that such infringement cannot be enjoined renders meaningless
the "exclusive right" recognized by the statute. Moreover, the language in three of the
defenses enumerated in § 33(b) clearly contemplates the use of incontestability in
infringement actions by plaintiffs."
Turning to the policies underpinning trademark law, Justice O'Connor found no
reason to part from the plain meaning of the statute. "The incontestability provisions,
as the proponents of the Lanham Act emphasized, provide a means for the registrant
to quiet title in the ownership of his mark: The opportunity to obtain incontestable
status by satisfying the requirements of § 15 thus encourages producers to cultivate
the goodwill associated with a particular mark.""'
The Supreme Court's most recent decision in the trademark field is Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara , Ic 52 The plaintiff Samara manufactured seersucker
children's garments. Wal-Mart contracted with a supplier for a large quantity of
children's seersucker garments to be sold under Wal-Mart's house brand, "Small
Steps." Wal-Mart based its design on samples of Samara's garments, making some
alterations. Samara brought suit under both copyright and trade dress theories, and
prevailed at trial on both claims. Wal-Mart appealed the judgment on the ground that
Samara's clothing designs were not distinctive for purposes of the Lanham Act and
there was insufficient evidence of consumer confusion. 3 The plaintiff did not claim
secondary meaning in its clothing line, and hence the validity of its trade dress claim
hinged on whether its clothing could qualify as inherently distinctive.
Justice Scalia began his analysis by noting the broad scope of marks that are
protectable under the Lanham Act, based either upon inherent distinctiveness or upon
a showing of secondary meaning, a distinction that has clear support in the language
of the statute He then noted that Qualitex indicates that color-only marks are
50. Id at 196 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1064).
51. Id at 198 (citing Hearings on H.R 82 before the Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Lanham); id, at 21, 113
(testimony of Daphne Robert, ABA Committee on Trade Mark Legislation); Hearings on H.R 102 et
al before the Subcommittee on Trade-Marks of the House Committee on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sees.
73 (1941) (remarks of Rep. Lanham)). Justice O'Connor rejected the dissent's argument that allowing
descriptive marks to become incontestable would allow monopolization of descriptive words. She noted
that ifa term becomes generic (as opposed to merely descriptive), it can be cancelled at any time on that
ground; that the fair use defense allows nontrademark use of descriptive terminology; and that
incontestable marks can be challenged if they are used in an anticompetitive way. Id at 201-02. "At
bottom, the dissent simply disagrees with the balance struck by Congress in determining the protection
to be given to incontestable marks." Id
52. 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
53. 165 F.3d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120S. Ct. 1339(2000). The court also affirmed
the copyright award. d at 132.
54. 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
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eligible for trademark protection only upon a showing of secondary meaning, and
found that a similar approach must be followed with regard to product configurations:
It seems to us that design, like color, is not inherently distinctive. The attribution of
inherent distinctiveness to certain categories of word marks and product packaging
derives from the fact that the very purpose of attaching a particular word to a product,
or encasing it in a distinctive packaging, is most often to identify the source of the
product. Although the words and packaging can serve subsidiary functions - a
suggestive word mark (such as "Tide" for laundry detergent), for instance, may invoke
positive connotations in the consumer's mind, and a garish form of packaging (such as
Tide's squat, brightly decorated plastic bottles for its liquid laundry detergent) may
attract an otherwise indifferent consumer's attention on a crowded store shelf - their
predominant function remains source identification. Consumers are therefore
predisposed to regard those symbols as indication of the producer, which is why such
symbols "almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand," and
"immediately... signal a brand or a product 'source."' And where it is not reasonable
to assume consumer predisposition to take an affixed word or packaging as indication
of source - where, for example, the affixed word is descriptive of the product ("Tasty"
bread) or of a geographic origin ("Georgia" peaches) - inherent distinctiveness will not
be found. ... In the case of product design, as in the case of color, we think consumer
predisposition to equate the feature with the source does not exist. Consumers are aware
of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product designs - such
as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin - is intended not to identify the source, but
to render the product itself more useful or more appealing. The fact that product design
almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification not only renders
inherent distinctiveness problematic; it also renders application of an inher-
ent-distinctiveness principle more harmful to other consumer interests. Consumers
should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and
esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates
plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent
distinctivenessss
The Court was clearly concerned with the potentially anticompetitive conse-
quences of allowing protection for trade dress based on inherent distinctiveness.
Justice Scalia then distinguished Two Pesos, noting that it addressed trade dress but
not product configurations. He acknowledged that the distinction between these two
can be unclear. Indeed the restaurant dacor in Two Pesos itself cannot neatly be
characterized as trade dress; Justice Scalia acknowledged that the d6cor might
constitute "some tertiun quid that is akin to product packaging."'
Prior to the decision in Samara, some commentators had suggested the Supreme
Court cases discussed in this article did not provide guidance for the questions
plaguing the courts in resolving trade dress and trademark dilution disputes. Michael
Landau suggested, for example, that there is inconsistency between the Two Pesos
rule that marks are analyzed in the same manner and the language in Qualitex that
color marks require a showing of secondary meaning and do not qualify as inherently
55. Id at 5.
56. 1, at 6.
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distinctive."' It may well be that a color standing alone is ordinarily descriptive under
the traditional trademark taxonomy and thus will not qualify as inherently distinctive.
Although there may have been some inconsistency in these decisions with regard to
the specific topic of color-alone marks, the Court's opinions do provide guidance for
current trademark debates.
Read together, the Supreme Court's trademark cases can be read to provide several
guiding principles for trademark law. The first principle is that any mark capable of
distinguishing the source of the goods or services in question is potentially eligible
for protection under the Lanhamn Act. It should not matter whether the mark is a
word, a symbol, a color, product packaging, product configuration, the overall
appearance of the goods or of the establishment providing the service. The same
rules apply, the same rights adhere, and the same limits are effective. What matters,
the Court tells us in Qualitex, is the source-indicating capability of the mark, not its
ontological status.5 8 This principle is one that courts and commentators seem
predisposed to ignore, yet it is quite clearly grounded in the language and structure
of the Lanham Act, which entitles any mark "by which the goods of the applicant
may be distinguished from the goods of others" to be registered and protected, unless
it is otherwise precluded from registration by other specific statutory provisions.59
The Court has found no reason to treat ordinary trade dress claims any differently
than any other kind of trademark case.' The Court - in Qualitex and Samara - has
now specifically addressed specific categories of color-only marks or product
configurations. As to these types of marks, whether because they are descriptive in
nature, or because of concerns regarding competition, the Court now precludes a
finding of inherent distinctiveness.
The Supreme Court's decision is Samara very likely reached the correct result,
though it was probably unnecessary to establish such a bright-line rule. Certainly the
particular product configuration at issue in that case seemed quite ordinary (generic
or at best descriptive). Yet, the Court did not really engage in this inquiry, instead
deeming all product configurations ineligible for protection as inherently distinctive
marks. Congress is quite capable of establishing carve-outs and other special
categories of trademarks. Indeed it did so explicitly in the Lanham Act. The statute
identifies descriptive marks as eligible for protection only upon a showing of
secondary meaning, unlike marks that have inherent distinctiveness. The statute also
precludes certain types of marks from protection entirely, including marks that are
57. Michael B. Landau, ReconcilingQualitex with Two Pesos: Ambiguity and Jnconsistencyfrom
the Supreme Court, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 219 (1996) (arguing that the Court's treatment of color marks
in Qualitex is inconsistent with Two Pesos and has resulted in differing interpretations regarding the
analysis of marks consisting of a color alone). See also infra notes 87-91.
58. 514 U.S. at 162-63.
59. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 772 (quoting 60 Stat. 428).
60. See id. at 770 ("There is no persuasive reason to apply to trade dress a general requirement of
secondary meaning which is at odds with the principles generally applicable to infringement suits under
§43(a).").
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scandalous, deceptive, disparaging, functional, and so forth. 61 Congress has made
specific exceptions to laws of general applicability in other fields of intellectual
property as well, such as the patent law exemption for the use of medical procedures
in the course of treatment.62
The interpretive rule suggested here has been followed, with some consistency, by
the courts in other areas of intellectual property law. Thus, for example, when faced
with the question of whether a genetically-engineered microorganism, i.e., a living
bacterium, could be a patentable product, the Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty3 looked to the language of the Patent Act, which, like the Lanham Act,
is cast in broad terms. Finding no reason to carve out an exception for this type of
subject matter, the Court held that the microorganism could indeed be patented.
Although Congress is free to draft legislation to exclude particular subject matter
from eligibility for patent protection, it was not the province of the judiciary to create
its own exceptions. The Federal Circuit took the same approach in State Street Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,' holding that the language and
structure of the Patent Act do not support a "business methods" exception, and
therefore that business methods are subject to the same analysis as any patentable
subject matter. There is no reason to believe the courts would or should depart from
the interpretive approach they applied in the patent cases when resolving trademark
issues, particularly given the broad wording of both statutory schemes.
In determining whether a mark is eligible for protection under the Lanham Act, it
is necessary to categorize it according to its source-indicating capability. There are
two ways to look at this question in a manner consistent with the statutes and case
law. One would require that the mark be categorized in the fanciful-arbitrary-
suggestive-descriptive-generic spectrum, drawn from the Second Circuit's Abercrom-
bie decision. In the case of some marks, particularly colors and product configura-
tions, an analysis making use of these categories may be somewhat awkward, as this
approach is somewhat ill-suited to non-verbal marks. Nonetheless, courts should try.
If a court encounters difficulty making use of the traditional Abercrombie factors, the
Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos does seem to leave some room for a slightly
broader approach. The Court did state that "[m]arks are often classified in categories
of generally increasing distinctiveness,"65 and the use of these categories was not
specifically in issue in Two Pesos.
A somewhat broader approach would focus, however, on the same fundamental
inquiry as would be used under the traditional approach - does the trade dress in
question, by its nature, serve as a source identifier? Some trade dress will be found
inherently distinctive, such as the restaurant decor, layout, color scheme, and external
and internal appearance in Two Pesos itself. Some trade dress will be descriptive, like
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a)(1994)(immoral, deceptive, scandalous, disparaging marks), 1052(e)-(f)
(requiring secondary meaning for descriptive marks). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(b)-(d) (barring various
other types of marks from protection).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1994 & Supp. Ill 1997).
63. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
64. 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
65. 505 U.S. at 768 (emphasis added)).
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the green-gold cleaning pads in Qualitex, and thus must attain secondary meaning in
order to be protectable. These are cases where the trade dress is simply not
sufficiently distinctive to be inherently capable of source indication, but by its nature
and context it can become a source-identifier in the marketplace. Other trade dress
will be generic and unprotectable, such as trade dress involving a common clothing
or jewelry feature." This broader approach retains the three dispositive categories
that the Court in Two Pesos mandates, without necessarily forcing courts to slice the
baloney too thin by further breaking down marks into categories of suggestive,
arbitrary, and fanciful. These categories have limited legal significance, at least as
to whether a mark is entitled to protection ab initio.67 This broader approach remains
faithful to the structure of the Lanham Act, which clearly requires that marks be
categorized as generic, descriptive, or inherently distinctive.
C. TRADEMARK POLICY
The Lanham Act had two general purposes, according to the Senate Report: "One
is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing
a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks
for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,
time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-
established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner." The
Report indicated that the Act would further serve "to protect the public from deceit,
to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of
reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created
them to those who have not. This is the end to which this bill is directed."" The
House Report indicates that an important goal of the Act was to provide uniform
nationwide relief for trademarks, which were increasingly used on a national if not
global scale."0 Finally, Representative Lanham, the bill's namesake and sponsor,
66. See infra notes 120-42 and accompanying text.
67. The other point at which it becomes important to categorize a mark as to its inherent
distinctiveness is in the analysis of likelihood of confusion. In that analysis, courts must determine the
degree of strength a mark possesses, as measured by its inherent and acquired distinctiveness. See, e.g.,
Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 840 (1 ith Cir. 1983) ("[T]he more distinctive
plaintiff's mark, the stronger it is considered, and the more protection it is accorded from confusingly
similar marks."); see also W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 572 (2d Cir. 1993)
(in likelihood of confusion analysis, courts look to inherent and acquired distinctiveness); Blockbuster
Entertainment Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 509-510 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (same).
68. S. REP. No.79-1333, at 3 (1946).
69. !d. at4.
70. H.R. REP. No. 76-944, at 4 (1939) (indicating purpose of Act is to provide national protection
for marks and noting that protection of trademarks was formerly "entirely e State matter," with the result
that trademark rights "in one State may differ widely from the rights which [that person] enjoys in
another").
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stated: "The purpose of [the Act] is to protect legitimate business and the consumers
of the country."7 Thus, the legislative history identifies three principal goals for
trademark law - prevention of consumer confusion and deception, protection of good
will against free riding, and providing a nationwide system of rights for all marks.
Some would look to later congressional action, seeking an indication of legislative
acquiescence in the courts' interpretation of the statute.72 Thus, the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988, 71 among other things, broadened the language of § 43(a) to
make it clear that the provision prohibits any confusingly similar trade dress or
trademark generally, without a requirement of "falsity," protects unregistered marks
(as trade dress often will be), and encompasses non-functional trade dress and product
configurations. 4 Congress also recognized that, since being enacted, section 43(a)
"has been widely interpreted as creating, in essence, a federal law of unfair
competition. For example, it has been applied to cases involving the infringement of
unregistered marks, violations oftrade dress and certain nonfunctional configurations
of goods and actionable false advertising claims.""5 There is also an indication that,
in maintaining avery broad definition of a mark, Congress quite deliberately intended
it to encompass all forms of trade dress, including product configurations.76
It is now fairly clear that section 43(a) essentially codified the common law torts
of trademark infringement and passing off." It is also clear, as the Court has
recognized, that trademarks of all kinds serve important social and economic
functions. As Judge Easterbrook has suggested, "[tirademarks help consumers to
select goods."78 They provide information to consumers regarding the identity of
producers, they reduce search costs, and they encourage and reward the development
ofconsistently high-quality products. Finally, they prevent free riding by competitors
upon the good will of established trademarks. 9 Merely descriptive terms, on the
other hand, are in the public domain and are unprotectable absent secondary meaning.
71. 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946).
72. See generally Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286,309(1911) ("When several acts
of Congress are passed touching the same subject-matter, subsequent legislation may be considered to
assist in the interpretation of prior legislation upon the same subject."); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-381 (1969).
73. 102 Stat. 3935 (1988)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1052 (1994).
74. See S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. The Senate Report for the 1988 amendments provides that the words "symbol or device" were
retained in the definition of trademark "so as not to preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or
configurations where they function as trademarks." Id. at 44.
77. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 785-86 (Thomas, J., concurring); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Lab.,
Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., concurring).
78. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429-30 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1147 (1986).
79. Id. at 1430. Others have discussed and analyzed various possible rationales for trademarks.
Compare Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation,
65 NOTE DAME L. REv. 397 (1990); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) with Simone
A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for "Famous" Trademarks: Anti-Competitive
"Monopoly" or Earned Property Right?, 47 FLA. L. REv. 653 (1995) (suggesting other bases for dilution
statute).
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To permit the monopolization of common terms would allow "a free ride on the
language."' 0 So long as trademarks are properly constrained in scope, then, they
serve quite legitimate and important functions. Certainly there is little disagreement
that traditional trademark law prevents deception and furthers efficient markets.
Although there is less agreement on whether trade dress and dilution claims are
efficient, these legal theories serve the same general functions. In other words, if a
mark truly is source-identifying, its ontological status is irrelevant. Hence protection
for trade dress should encompass not only product packaging but also product
configurations in appropriate circumstances. Although the Court in Samara need not
have established a per se prohibition on protection of product configurations absent
a showing of secondary meaning, its prophylactic rule still leaves open the quite real
possibility that a product configuration does serve as a source-identifier (i.e., has
secondary meaning in the market). The precise economic rationale for dilution theory
is somewhat more difficult to ascertain, though once again there is a strong argument
that the owner of a famous mark (which carries greater source-indicating and
information-bearing capacity and selling power than ordinary marks) is entitled to
maximize its value and is in the best position to determine the nature and extent of use
of those marks.
The social costs of excessive or unbounded trademark protection can be
significant. David Lange has observed that trademark owners "are subject to natural
pressures to expand the boundaries of their interests, even at the risk of appearing
silly or rapacious and not infrequently at the cost of expropriatory incursions into the
public domain."'" Landes and Posner, in their 1987 article, 2 noted that there are four
types of costs associated with property rights, including trademark rights. These costs
include the transaction costs of transferring rights, the danger of rent-seeking
behavior, the cost of protecting and enforcing rights, and - in the case of public goods
such as intellectual property - the cost of vreventing the full use of that information
by others.8 3 To apply these considerations to trade dress and dilution law, the
transaction costs and enforcement costs associated with trademark dilution and trade
dress claims are probably similar to those costs that would be incurred in ordinary
trademark cases. It might be argued that these expanded areas of possible trademark
protection present particularly high costs given the wide range of possible dilution
and trade dress claims that might be asserted and the costliness of detecting and
litigating potential violations. One indication that dilution and trade dress laws do in
80. Id.
81. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBs. 147,168 (Autumn
1981).
82. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30J.L.
& ECON. 265 (1987). Other earlier works include Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L.Teply, Trademarked
Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323 (1980); Lee B. Burgunder, An Economic Approach to Trademark
Genericism, 23 AM. Bus. L.J. 391 (1985); Peter Mims, Note, Promotional Goods and Functionality
Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 TEX. L. REv. 639 (1984). Subsequent articles include
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267
(1988); A. Samuel Oddi, Product Simulation: From Tort to Intellectual Property, 88 TRADEMARK REP.
101 (1998).
83. Landes & Posner, supra note 82, at 266-68.
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fact generate substantial costs is the sheer volume of litigation involving these two
types of claims."
The other two costs that Landes and Posner identified may also be pertinent to
dilution and trade dress cases. First, there is a very real danger that parties will
engage in rent-seeking behavior by asserting a monopoly on a particular distinctive
mark (in a dilution situation) or on a product configuration (in a trade dress case).
There will be a strong incentive to assert such claims regularly and vigorously, as
there may be a significant reward involved in establishing that a particular mark is
famous and thus worthy of protection from dilution or in obtaining a trademark right
to a product configuration. Having successfully asserted these claims, the trademark
owner may be able to obtain damages or injunctive relief, or a favorable settlement
involving a license fee, from those found to be infringing. Moreover, trademark
owners will have an incentive to assert claims over even arguably functional product
configurations, as a successful trademark claim on these features would provide them
with a real and lasting advantage in the marketplace. As Justice Scalia suggested in
Samara, courts should be cognizant of these dangers in setting the boundaries of
trademark protection, although it may be difficult to distinguish vigorous trademark
enforcement from improper incursions on the public domain.
The fourth cost of intellectual property protection in the Landes-Posner analysis
deals with the marginal cost of reproducing the information once it has been created.
The standard economic analysis would suggest that public goods are costly to create
and difficult to appropriate in the absence of property rights. Once the information
has been created, it is inexhaustible. In other words, the use by one or one thousand
or one million other persons will not diminish the ability of others to make use of the
public good. On one level, this analysis seems more closely suited to copyrights and
patents, but trademarks may also display the characteristics of public goods,
particularly with regard to trade dress and product configurations. The counter to this
view is that overuse of a widely recognized trademark may undercut its informational
value, and that the trademark owner is therefore entitled to control its use and to
prevent overexposure. Viewed in this manner, a trademark is not a classic public
good and hence the rationale for permitting access to trademarks is not as strong as
in the case of patents and copyrights.
The problem of boundaries in intellectual property law, then, is the problem of
balancing the costs and benefits of allowing trademark protection in a given situation.
Courts must determine when a valuable trademark, which provides consumers with
information and reduces search costs, is being infringed and distinguish those cases
from situations in which the trademark owner is asserting rights to the underlying
product itself, raising dangers of monopolization, or rights in gross, totally removed
from the good will and brand recognition to which it is entitled. The question is
whether traditional trademark doctrine offers sufficiently precise doctrinal tools to
accomplish this balancing.
84. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Oddi discusses at some length the costs and benefits
of product configuration protection in his recent article. Oddi, supra note 82, at 111-29 (concluding that
such protection is more 6ostly and less beneficial than ordinary marks).
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II. THE BOUNDARIES OF TRADE DRESS PROTECION
A. EXPANDED PROTECTION FOR TRADE DRESS
Particularly since the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, a wide and growing
variety of trade dress cases have been brought, covering an array of different product
packaging, as well as products and product features. At least until Two Pesos, there
had been some question concerning whether trade dress can be registered on the
principal register, or whether it is protected solely under section 43(a) and any state
law counterparts. This issue seems to have been resolved by implication in Two
Pesos's holding that trade dress questions are analyzed in the same manner as other
trademarks under the Lanham Act."
The product packaging cases, of which there are many, are relatively uncontrover-
sial.8" This lack of controversy may reflect the fact that there are clearly many
packaging choices available to competitors and ordinarily no plausible claim that the
packaging serves functional purposes. Product packaging is largely an extension of
ordinary trademarks found on products such as logos and brand names. Thus, not
only is the name Coca-Cola protectable, but so is the red-and-white swirl packaging
of its producer's cans and the distinctive shape of the old-fashioned Coke bottle.
Much more controversial are decisions involving product configurations or
designs. A large number of decisions have addressed the nature and extent of
85. Compare Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 1994) (plurality
opinion) (rTjrade dress may now be registered on the Principal Register of the PTO. The trade dress at
issue in this case was so registered."); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993) (faucet's
shape registerable as a trademark); Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A.
1964) (shape of bottle registrable as trademark) with Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft
Corp., 58 F.3d 1498,1499 n. I ( 10th Cir. 1995) ("One does not register a product's trade dress - its overall
look or image - but trade dress is protected under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.") (citation omitted);
Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609,613 (9th Cir. 1989) (trade dress protection provides
broader protection for aspects of packaging and product design that are not registerable as trademarks).
86. The following is a sampling of recent cases: Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens
Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (plastic fruit juice bottles); Carillon
Importers, Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Int'l Group, Ltd., 112 F.3d 1125 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (upholding injunction
involving trade dress infringement of vodka bottles); Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame
Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 1996) (successful claim for infringement of mail order
company's catalog trade dress); Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unsuccessful claim involving packaging of reusable diapers); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co.,
46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (no likelihood of confusion in packaging of hand lotion); Tone Bros., Inc.
v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that fact issues were presented regarding
distinctiveness of spice containers); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577
(2d Cir. 1993) (trade dress claim for "Ouzo" packaging); George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d
1532 (2d Cir. 1992) (trade dress ofmetal polishing cleaners was infringed); Mexican Food Specialties,
Inc. v. Festida Foods, Ltd., 953 F. Supp. 1831 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (packagingof tortillas protected as trade
dress); Benjamin Moore & Co. v. Talon Paints Prods., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 331 (D.NJ. 1996) (paint
packaging trade dress may be infringed by competitor); see also Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs.,
Inc., 127 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1997) (no infringement of grocery store trade dresi).
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protection available for product configurations as trade dress.8 7 In assessing the
87. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993) (faucet design entitled to trade dress
protection); International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1993) (no
likelihood of confusion in trade dress of audio speakers); Big Top U.S.A., Inc. v. Wittem Group, 998
F.Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1998) (no likelihood of confusion as to giant-sized vending machines that dispense
gumballs); Lanier v. Bandwagon, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mass. 1997) (back scratcher not entitled to
trade dress protection); Foamation, Inc. v. Wedeward Enters., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Wis. 1997)
(novelty cheese wedge hats not protected as trade dress); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1, Ltd., 942 F.
Supp. 1513 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (defendant liable for trade dress infringement as to one hole ofgolf course);
Central Tools, Inc. v. Products Eng'g Corp., 936 F. Supp. 58 (D.R.I. 1996) (trade dress in tools has
acquired secondary meaning and was non-functional, but defendant's products did not create likelihood
of confusion); St Paul Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Bergman, 935 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Kans. 1996) (fact issues
presented regarding trade dress infringement claim involving roll-top door on gun cabinet); Sassafras
Enters., Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 915 F. Supp. I (N.D. III. 1996) (stoneware pizza set trade dress not
protectable because of lack of inherent or acquired distinctiveness); Health 0 Meter, Inc. v Terraillon
Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160 (N.D. I1. 1995) (split-mat platform design for professional scales is protectable
trade dress, but 'J'-shaped product configuration was not protectable); Fasa Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc.,
869 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. 111. 1994) (fact issues presented in trade dress claim involving futuristic role-
playing games); Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (fact issues presented on
distinctiveness and functionality of sweater design); Great Am. Audio Corp. v. Metacom, Inc., 938 F.2d
16 (2d Cir. 1995) (trade dress claim involving toy school bus in which tapes can be played). See also
Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg Corp., 1998 WL 231180 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation limited by
circuit rule) (overall appearance of chairs); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 1026 (7th
Cir. 1998) (fact issues presented on claim involving cable ties); Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co.,
123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (successful claim for infringement of plaintiff's stand mixer); Forschner
Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 1997) (use of red color on "Swiss Army" knives
was not protectable as trade dress); Oddzon Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(no likelihood of confusion as to trade dress on toys); Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co.,
113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997) (vacating injunction in case involving trade dress of commercial outdoor
furniture); Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 F.3d 1034 (1 Ith Cir. 1997) (design of composite steel floor
deck, including dovetail-shaped ribs, was functional and not protectable as trade dress); lnsty*Bit, Inc.
v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1997) (fact issues presented as to confusion and
fimctionality in case involving infringement of trade dress in quick-change drill chucks and accessories);
Dofr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996) (no likelihood of confusion as to
"clamshell" design of corn starch washers); TEC Eng'g Corp. v. Budget Molders Supply, Inc., 82 F.3d
542 (1 st Cir. 1996) (remanding for findings on distinctiveness and confusion in case involving industrial
conveyor trade dress); Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (windsock duck decoys); L
& J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 1996) (no inherent distinctiveness
or secondary meaning in mission-style furniture); EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487 (2d
Cir. 1996) (no trade dress protection in troll dolls); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d
Cir. 1995) (squirrel and leaf designs on sweaters were not protectable as trade dress); Elmer v. ICC
Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (no protectable trade dress in vehicle-mounted advertising
signs); Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (fact issue presented
regarding functionality of color-coding system for elastic exercise bands); Tough Traveler, Ltd. v.
Outbound Prods., Inc., 60 F.3d 964 (2d Cir. 1995) (delay precluded injunctive relief in trade dress case
involving child carriers); Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1995) (spiral configuration of fan grill, which was subject of utility patent, was functional and thus
unprotected as trade dress); Jeffrey Millstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995)
(greeting cards with cut-out animals, people, or objects were not entitled to trade dress protection);
Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (furniture design trade dress was
inherently distinctive and was infringed); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995)
(remanding for consideration of claim involving project planner and notebook trade dress); Duraco Prods.,
Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994) (Grecian-style plastic planters not distinctive
and lacking in secondary meaning).
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growth of trade dress protection, the most important doctrinal development has been
judicial recognition that the overall design and appearance of the product itself, that
is, the product configuration - not just the product's accompanying packaging - is
eligible for federal trademark protection. Thus, claims are asserted for such things
as the design and appearance of stand mixers, faucets, nylon luggage, Rubik's Cubes,
books, and plastic planters - though not always successfully. 8
Commentators have leveled a number of criticisms regarding the application of
trademark and trade dress protection to product configurations. Mark Lemley has
lamented the expansion of trade dress protection in this field: "What started as an
exceptional doctrine for cases in which the risk to goodwill was evident has expanded
into a trademark doctrine of general applicability, one that virtually any manufacturer
can invoke to secure additional protections for its products. In the process, the link
between product configuration and consumer source identification has all but
disappeared."89 Lemley traces the problem to the Two Pesos holding that trade dress
(including product configurations) can be protected if inherently distinctive. He
views the use of the Abercrombie categories to product designs as "frequently
nonsensical," but briefly recognizes that rejecting such an approach may be
inconsistent with Two Pesos." The problem, as will be discussed below, is that
rejecting at least some version of these categories is inconsistent with both Two Pesos
and the Lanham Act's language and structure itself. Lemley also underestimates the
extent to which the requirement that trademark plaintiffs prove a likelihood of
confusion has served as a constraint on the over-extension of trade dress protection.
Theodore Davis has suggested that trade dress protection should be "thin" or
limited, and draws an analogy to the "thin" copyright available for factual compila-
tions.9 Thus Davis would apply the strictures and mandate of the copyright decision
88. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (stand mixer found to
have secondary meaning and to have been infringed); Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40
F.3d 1431, 1454 (3d Cir. 1994) (plastic garden planters held not to be inherently distinctive and lacking
in secondary meaning); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985) (luggage
protectable as trade dress); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Corp., 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982) (Rubik's
Cube).
89. Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1701 (1999).
90. Id. at 1701 n.78 (noting that some courts have rejected these categories and stating that
"[while this approach makes sense, it is arguably inconsistent with Two Pesos, where the Supreme Court
held that the same standards applied to trade dress as to word marks.").
91. Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of
Trade Dress Protection, 80 MiNN. L. REV. 595 (1996). Jay Dratler, on the other hand, has suggested that
trade dress protection for product configurations fills a distinct gap in federal protection for industrial
designs. Jay Drater, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, U. ILL. L. REv. 887 (1988)
[hereinafter, Drater]. Dradter's argument is quite consistent with developments that have occurred since
his article was written, as has been suggested here. He argues that properly deined protection for product
configurations does not conflict with patent law or policy. Id. at 889; see also Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade
Dress Protection for Product Configurations: Is There a Conflict with Patent Policy?, 24 AM. INTELL.
PRop. L. ASSN. Q.J. 427 (1996).
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in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.' to the trade dress field.
To Davis, the doctrine of functionality has constitutional significance in that it avoids
a conflict between the perpetual protection available for trade dress and the limited-
time protection authorized and provided for in utility patents. Davis suggests that the
Supreme Court has given little guidance on this subject.93 Yet the functionality
doctrine has been reaffirmed in Court's Two Pesos-Qualitex-Park 'N Fly trilogy, and
is firmly established both in common law trademark doctrine and now (after his
article was written) in the statutory scheme. The functionality doctrine can and
should be applied rigorously in trade dress cases, particularly those involving product
configurations, as a matter of substantive trademark law. Thus the constitutional
conflict with limited-term utility patents is avoided, a result which avoids the problem
Davis correctly identifies. A number of other articles have been written criticizing
the development of trade dress law as applied to product designs, either on the ground
that they are per se unprotectable or that they should be subject to a different
analytical framework."
Significantly, the Seventh Circuit, in Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc.," which involved
plumbing fixtures, held that bestowing trade dress protection on product configura-
tions did not pose an impermissible conflict with the Patent Clause of the Constitu-
tion. The court noted that trademark protection is not as extensive as the protection
provided by design patents, particularly given the requirement of consumer
confusion, and that different aspects of a product's design and appearance can
simultaneously be given protection under different statutory schemes. The Fifth
Circuit, in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co.,' held that the Mixmaster stand
mixer had secondary meaning and was infringed. The court rejected the defense
92. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the white pages telephone
directory lacked sufficient creativity to meet the requirements of an original work of authorship for
purposes of copyrightability.
93. Davis, supra note 91, at 646 (noting that trade dress law lacks the clear line of demarcation
the Supreme Court set forth for copyright law); id. at 649-50 ("Despite the absence of express guidance
from the Supreme Court, therefore, courts can and should recognize that, just as the Constitution restricts
the ability of copyright owners to protect public domain elements oftheir works, it concomitantly restricts
the ability of trade dress owners to do the same.").
94. See Margreth Barrett, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations and the Federal
Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 507-10 (1998) (arguing that Two Pesos fails to
address anticompetitive concerns in product configuration cases and endorsing Second and Third Circuit
view that product configurations are analyzed differently than other marks); Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note,
From Fast Cars to Fast Food: Overbroad Protection of Trade Dress under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2037 (1993) (arguing that protection for industrial designs under section 43(a) is
overly broad, and should be limited to designs that have secondary meaning, even after Two Pesos;
proposing that an industrial design statute should be enacted to provide exclusive protection for product
designs); Bradley K. Groff, Bare-fisted Competition or Palming Off?.: Protection for Product Design as
Trade Dress Under the Lanham Act, 23 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASSN. Q.J. 65 (1995) (arguing that
protection of product designs is beyond scope of Lanham Act); Oddi, supra note 82, at 128-29
(concluding that trademark protection for product configurations is more costly and less beneficial than
protection for ordinary marks).; David Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent- The Dilemma of Confusion,
30 RUTGERS L.J. 289, 290, 367 (1999) (arguing that section 43(a) should not protect product
configurations).
95. 12 F.3d 632, 638-39 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing other decisions).
96. 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997).
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argument that such protection for the product design provided a "permanent patent,"
as only the overall appearance of the mixer was protectable, not individual functional
elements, which could be freely copied. The court noted that providing trade dress
protection furthers important policies of protecting good will and preventing
confusion, which had been shown to be implicated on the facts of the case.
B. SOME LIMITING PRINCIPLES
Under the common law, trademark protection exists for the primary purpose of
preventing consumer confusion as to the source of goods or services. In providing
this protection, courts protect the owner of a trademark and the public from the
encroachment of confusingly similar marks. The Lanham Act, by its express
language and purpose, serves a similar fundamental function.97 Indeed, section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act in particular provides for a federal common law of unfair
competition." Traditional trademark and trade dress law thus encourages production
of products of high quality "and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell
inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability quickly to evaluate the
quality of an item offered for sale."" More importantly for our purposes, trademark
and trade dress protection serves to protect both the trademark or trade dress owner
and the public by avoiding confusion or mistake.
Three traditional trademark doctrines can serve as a constraining influence on trade
dress claims - a careful assessment of the distinctiveness of the trade dress, a strict
functionality test, and a real weighing of the likelihood of consumer confusion."o
1. Distinctiveness
The most important doctrinal constraint on trademark law is the requirement of
distinctiveness. The conceptual underpinning of this doctrine is quite important -
only marks that are capable of identifying a particular source of goods or services are
97. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (indicating that "the
statutory definition of a trademark ... requires that a person 'us[el' or 'inten[d] to use' the mark 'to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold
by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown'" (alterations in original)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127)); Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aastar Mortgage Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 9 (1 st Cir. 1996)
("The purpose of trademark laws is to prevent the use of the same or similar marks in a way that confuses
the public about the actual source of the goods or service.").
98. See Milton Handler, A Personal Note on Trademark and Unfair Competition Law Before the
Lanham Act, 59 SPG-LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,9 (1996).
99. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164.
100. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 16, cmt. b (1995) ("Rigorous
application of the requirements of distinctiveness and nonfunctionality is necessary in order to avoid
undermining the carefully circumscribed statutory regimes for the protection of useful and ornamental
designs under federal patent and copyright law."). See also Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for
Industrial Designs, U. ILL. L. REV. 887,938-62 (1988)(endorsing, prior to Two Pesos, use of trademark
protection for industrial designs, constrained by distinctiveness and nonfunctionality requirements);
Lemley, supra note 89, at 1714 (suggesting briefly that distiactiveness and functionality doctrines can
limit product configuration claims).
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eligible for the protections of the Lanham Act. By careful classification of marks,
courts can prevent the usurpation of common terms, ordinary packaging methods, or
standard product configurations - each of these being unprotected and not indicative
of any particular source in the market. At the same time, when a word or symbol or
product packaging serves a source-indicating and informative function, it is entitled
to protection a priori. The principal question that has plagued the courts in addressing
trade dress claims is the manner in which the distinctivoness of product configurations
should be analyzed. Ordinarily, courts assess the distinctiveness -and hence the
degree ofprotectability - by making use of the five categories set forth in Abercrom-
bie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive,
(4) arbitrary, and (5) fanciful.'0 ' Generic marks are not protectable, as they typically
consist of the name of a product category or type, such as Washington apples;
descriptive marks, which to some degree describe a characteristic of the product, are
protectable only if they have attainted sufficient recognition to have secondary
meaning, such as Holiday Inn hotels; suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are
inherently protectable without any showing of secondary meaning, such as the coined
term "Exxon." The Supreme Court's Two Pesos decision endorsed the application
of these categories to trade dress cases generally, as discussed above. 2
The question that divided the lower courts, prior to Samara, is how to apply this
approach to cases involving product configurations that are claimed as the trademark
owner's trade dress. Most trademarks are word marks or symbols, which are more
readily amenable to categorization under the Abercrombie approach. The Supreme
Court's Two Pesos decision held that trade dress must also be analyzed for inherent
distinctiveness. If the trade dress is inherently distinctive, as it was found to be on the
facts of Two Pesos itself, then the Court held that it is entitled to protection without
a showing of secondary meaning.0 3
Commentators have suggested analytical approaches that are somewhat inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court's guidance in Two Pesos. One commentator, for
example, has argued that product configurations should receive no trademark
protection at all, and that Congress instead should enact an industrial design statute. "
The Second and Third Circuits have applied a different analytical approach to product
configuration cases. The Third Circuit, in Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic
Enterprises,'5 was the first to diverge from Abercrombie when it decided that the
"trademark taxonomy, carefully and precisely crafted through a long succession of
cases to accommodate the particularities oftradenarks, does not fit the quite different
considerations applicable to product configurations." The case involved plastic
garden planters in the shape of Grecian urns. The court decided that the holding of
Two Pesos was limited to trade dress consisting of product packaging, not product
configuration, because a restaurant's decor was analogous to product packaging.
Duraco set forth a new and entirely different test for assessing product configuration
101. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
102. 505 U.S. at 768 (discussing and applying Abercrombie factors to trade dress of restaurant)
103. Id.
104. Welkowitz, supra note 94, at 367-69; see also Groff, supra note 94, at 75-79.
105. 40 F.3d 1431, 1440-42 (3d Cir. 1994).
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trade dress: in order to be protected, it must be "(i) unusual and memorable; (ii)
conceptually separable from the product; and (iii) likely to serve primarily as a
designator of origin of the product."'"
The Second Circuit has also concluded that the distinctiveness of product
configurations should be analyzed differently than the rest of trademark and trade
dress law. In Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd,"° the court found that squirrel and
leaf artwork designs on a children's sweater were not inherently distinctive because
the designs were primarily aesthetic and "not primarily intended as source
identification." The court agreed with the Third Circuit view that Abercrombie did
not apply to product configuration cases, as the categorical approach "make[s] little
sense when applied to product features."' 8 The Second Circuit, however, did not
adopt the Third Circuit's "wholly-new, multi-pronged test." Instead it "simply asked
whether the design was likely to be understood as an indicator of the product's
source."'" In addition, the Second Circuit requires that the design of a product must
have been "primarily intended as source identification."' "
Some commentators have also suggested that the standard trademark taxonomy is
ill-suited to trade dress cases generally and that a different analytical framework
should be used, in effect endorsing the Second and Third Circuit views."' This
approach, however, is inconsistent with the language and general tenor of Two Pesos,
which rejected the view that particular types of marks should be analyzed differently
than an ordinary word or symbolic mark. More directly, this approach has no basis
in the language or structure of the Lanham Act, which entitles all source-indicating
marks to the same protections. Despite the Court's holding in Samara, the
establishment of special per se rules for product configuration cases is arguably
unfounded, absent a specific carve-out by Congress."12
106. Id. at 1449.
107. 71 F.3d 996, 1007-08 (2d Cir. 1995).
108. Id.
109. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373,378 (2d Cir. 1997) (dealing
with configuration of outdoor furniture); see Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1008; L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal
Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258,265 (2d Cir. 1996) (no secondary meaning or inherent distinctiveness
in mission-style furniture). But see Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 784-85 (8th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting "memorability" test in favor of traditional trademark analysis); Imagineering, Inc. v. Van
Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1263-64 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding jury's finding of inherent
distinctiveness of line of furniture, applying Two Pesos without extended discussion).
110. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1009 (emphasis added). Lower courts in the Second Circuit have, of
course, generally followed their circuit rules. See, e.g., Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 916
F. Supp. 322,328 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Second Circuit approach and holding that crossword puzzle
lacked inherent or acquired distinctiveness); Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1070
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (sweater designs); New York Racing Ass'n. v. Perlmutter Publ'g, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 578,
581 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (racing horse design on souvenir items). See also EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie
& Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 487, 491 (2d Cir.1996) (troll dolls).
Ill. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 94, at 507-08 (endorsing approach of Second and Third Circuits);
Oddi, supra note 82, at 147-48 (suggesting that Two Pesos analysis should not apply to product
configurations).
112. Graeme Dinwoodie recognizes that Two Pesos at least implicitly rejects these approaches, but
contends that the standard trademark taxonomy should not be applied in product configuration cases.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress,
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In fact, courts seem to have been quite able to use the traditional trademark
analysis of distinctiveness in product design litigation in a manner that provides
workable boundaries. In Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A.,
Ltd.,"' the Fourth Circuit applied the traditional trademark analysis and concluded
that the plaintiff's furniture trade dress might be protectable and inherently
distinctive. The product configuration involved a neo-Roman design, the features of
which included "the high-gloss polyester Carmelstone and Goatskin finishes, off
white moldings on the night stands, dresser and armoire, classic columns and fluting
on the headboard and mirror, and arched tops on the mirror and headboard frames."' 4
It was shown never to have been used in the bedroom furniture field and to be unique
and distinctive, and the court overturned the lower court's ruling that the trade dress
was not distinctive as a matter of law. "'
Giant gum ball machines were at issue in Big Top USA, Inc. v. Wittern Group,"
6
and the court found them to be sufficiently distinctive to qualify as trade dress. These
were not just any gum ball machines. They were big, and had particular distinctive
elements including a circus theme, large red ball, volcano shape, musical accompani-
ment, animal figures, and shape of base. In a carefully written opinion, the court
found these overall elements to be distinctive, although other aspects of the product
were functional. Nevertheless, the plaintiff ultimately failed to show a likelihood of
consumer confusion.'"7 A child carrier was found to have inherent distinctiveness in
Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Products,"' in that it had unusual zipper
placements (diagonal in part), unusual size and shape pouches, a triangular stand, a
hinged frame, and other features. Ultimately, however, the plaintiff did not prevail
because it could not show a likelihood of consumer confusion." 9 The trade dress
finding in this case may be somewhat troubling, but a possible bad result was
tempered by the plaintiff's failure to show confusion.
The Abercrombie approach can also be used effectively to identify cases of
descriptive product configurations. In Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 181Ltd.,'2 ° the Fifth
Circuit noted that the trade dress of a golf hole may be generic if it connotes golf
holes generally, but where the plaintiff adds an unusual or unexpected feature, such
as a lighthouse, it becomes descriptive. As a descriptive trade dress, the court found
that the golf hole had secondary meaning in that it was well known in the field, had
75 N.C. L. Rev. 471 (1997). Dinwoodie argues that Two Pesos and Qualitex offer no "significant
guidance" on the distinctiveness inquiry, id. at 480, but he does suggest that product configurations
should be placed on an equal footing with other marks, id. at 602-03. He criticizes both the Abercrombie
approach and the approach of the Second and Third Circuits, and suggests instead an inquiry into whether
.consumers will identify the product by reference to the features claims as trade dress?" Id. at 603-605
(focusing on nature of design, context in which it is perceived by purchasers, and nature of product).
113. 187 F.3d 363, 377 (4th Cir. 1999).
114. /d. at374.
115. Id. See also Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (greeting cards
consisting ofparticular combinations of colors, handwriting, borders, and slogans found to be distinctive).
116. 998 F. Supp. 30, 43-44 (D. Mass. 1998).
117. Id
118. 989 F. Supp. 203, 209 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
119. Idat 217.
120. 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998).
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substantial sales, advertising, and publicity, and was deliberately imitated by the
defendant.' 2'
This approach can also identify generic product configurations. InJe0fieyMilstein,
Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc.,"2 the Second Circuit held that the claimed greeting
card trade dress, which consisted of common and functional elements, including die-
cutting, photographs, and blank white interiors, was generic. In other words, no one
is entitled to a monopoly on greeting cards consisting of cut-out shapes and
photographs of people, animals, and objects. It should be noted that the Second
Circuit did not use its own Knitwaves analysis in the case, and instead used the
traditional approach. The idea that industry-wide use of a product design can render
it generic was reaffirmed in Indonesian Imports, Inc. v. Old Navy, Inc.," in which
the court held that the plaintiffs claims trade dress in a handbag known as "The Sak"
was generic. The Sak's claimed trade dress was an ambiguous combination of woven
nylon cord in various colors and a specific bag shape. One might say that the court
held that "The Sak" gets the boot. Similarly, a shiny back scratcher that contracted
for convenient carrying and that was sold in clear bags did not measure up to the
distinctiveness standard, as the court found that the back scratcher was either generic
or descriptive (and lacking any secondary meaning). 24
Finally, in Sunrise Jewelry Manufacturing Corp. v. Fred S.A. ,12 the Federal Circuit
held that a registered trade dress consisting of a "metallic nautical rope design" for
clocks, watches, and jewelry could be cancelled on the ground that it was generic.
Competitors can freely use trade dress that is or has become generic.126 Sunrise is an
interesting case, because it shows that the application of general trademark law to all
types of marks (including trade dress and product configurations) can be a two-edged
sword. The trademark owner in that case sought to prevent cancellation of its product
design mark on the ground that trade dress and product designs - unlike other marks
- could not be cancelled on grounds of being generic. The Federal Circuit actually
bothered to write an opinion holding that, in fact, any mark can be cancelled on this
ground, even trade dress marks. 2 1
Trade dress cases generally have also successfully categorized the trade dress in
question under traditional analysis. Thus, for example, the packaging of Klondike
bars has been found to be inherently distinctive. 2 In Fun-Damental Too, Ltd v.
121. 1999 WL 179680 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc. v. Contico
Int'l, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1247, 1261 (W.D. Va. 1993) (trash bins had secondary meaning).
122. 58 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995).
123. 1999 WL 179680, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
124. Lainer v. Bandwagon, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 292, 301 (D. Mass. 1997). See also Judith Ripka
Designs, Ltd. v. Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (under New York dilution statute, line of
"ancient inspired" jewelry was not inherently distinctive and lacked secondary meaning).
125. 175 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
126. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 744 (2d Cir. 1998) (product
packing trade dress case).
127. Sunrise, 175 F.3d at 1325-26.
128. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1532 (11th Cir. 1986).
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Gemmy Industries Corp.,2 9 the Second Circuit noted that trade dress which consists
of standard or customary product shapes or images is generic. Nevertheless, the court
on the facts found that the plaintiffs packaging trade dress for toy banks in the shape
of toilets, was inherently distinctive. The court noted that its .Knitwaves analysis
applied only to product configuration cases, and not to packaging cases. In another
case under New York law, the packaging on a "family" of inexpensive novelty items
such as manicure kits, key chains, and credit card holders was found to be descriptive
and lacking in secondary meaning. 3 °
At the other end of the spectrum, a grape leaf design was held to be generic as an
emblem in the wine industry. 3' Packaging lemon-lime soda in green cans or bottles
is common and generic. 3 Black-color cosmetic compacts were found to be common
and generic.' Red covers are generic for dictionaries.' And finally, no one has a
monopoly on the idea of a colonial-style candle store, as the overall appearance and
features of such a store are in part generic. 3
Despite the Court's view in Samara, a standard trademark analysis, rigorously
applied, could quite readily address each of the cases in which courts have attempted
to fashion idiosyncratic approaches for product configuration cases. The fall motif
consisting of squirrels and leaves on the sweater design in Knitwaves is a generic
clothing feature, in the same manner that cut-out photos are generic in the greeting
card industry (as was held in Jeffrey Milstein) and nautical rope designs are generic
when used on clocks, watches, and jewelry (as was held in Sunrise Jewelry).
Similarly, the floating feel of the furniture in Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia
Cascade Co.,36 which consisted principally of curved three-inch tubing, is possibly
generic or most likely descriptive and was not shown to have secondary meaning. In
Duraco, the Third Circuit could quite readily have concluded that the concept of a
Grecian urn for garden planters is also either generic or descriptive and lacking in
secondary meaning.'7 These are factual issues that should be resolved as they would
in any trademark case, by focusing on whether the mark functions as a source
indicator.
Ironically, the Second Circuit's idiosyncratic approach to the question of
distinctiveness can lead to protection of marks that might not qualify under the
traditional trademark taxonomy. One of the principal flaws in the Second Circuit
129. Ill F.3d993, 1000-05 (2dCir. 1997). The court noted that triangular boxes, open styling, red
arrows with the notation "try me," and raised blister packaging were common features, but the toilet motif
and flushing sound were distinctive in the toy bank field. Id at 1001.
130. Regal Jewelry.Co. v. Kingsbridge Int'l, 999 F. Supp. 477,480,493 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
131. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E & J Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042,1048-49 (9th Cir. 1998).
See also BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60 F.3d 1565, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("walking
fingers" are generic for purposes of telephone directories).
132. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1993).
133. Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1995).
134. Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1994).
135. The Yankee Candle Co. v. New England Candle Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D. Mass. 1998)
(finding some features to be generic and others to be functional in appearance of colonial- style candle
stores).
136. 113 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1997).
137. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1435 (noting consumer recognition of less than 0.5 percent).
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approach is its emphasis on the manufacturer's subjective intent in designing its trade
dress, which that circuit has repeatedly identified as an important consideration. 38
As Graeme Dinwoodie has observed, a focus on the intent of the designer completely
misperceives the proper focus - which must be on consumer perception of the design
in the marketplace. 39 His criticism is quite correct, and was highlighted in the
Second Circuit's recent decision in Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 40
which the Supreme Court recently reversed. The Court could have quite simply
concluded that the Second Circuit misapplied the distinctiveness standard, as the
clothing designs were descriptive or generic.
Applying its Knitwaves approach, which focuses on "whether the design was likely
to be understood as an indicator of the product's source," the Second Circuit focused
nearly exclusively on one piece of evidence - the intent of the clothing designer.' 41
The court then found the loosely defined trade dress to be distinctive, though it
appeared to involve a vague and quite basic combination of quite common features
that were not even used consistently across Samara's product line, as the dissent
persuasively demonstrated. 142 Significantly, the Second Circuit in Samara applied its
own taxonomy, which ostensibly is meant to restrict the number of product designs
eligible for trademark protection, to a design that should and quite possibly would
have been found to be descriptive and unprotected under the traditional trademark
approach suggested here. This anomaly demonstrates the fallacy of the Second
Circuit's focus on the intent of the designer or manufacturer, rather than on the proper
classification of the mark based on its degree of recognition in the marketplace. No
doubt the Supreme Court's concern regarding the potential for anticompetitive
usurpation of product configurations was presented in stark relief by the Second
Circuit's absurd result. It is thus not entirely surprising that it adopted a blanket
138. See, e.g., Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 378-79; Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1008-09; Dinwoodie,
supra note 112, at 545-49 (criticizing Second Circuit's focus on intent of designer); Oddi, supra note 82,
at 149-50 (noting intent-based approach of Second Circuit).
139. Dinwoodie, supra note 112, at 545-49 (noting improper focus of test and tendency to lead to
self-serving testimony).
140. 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 WL 552674 (Oct. 4,1999) (certiorari granted
on the question of "what must be shown to establish that a product's design is inherently distinctive for
purposes of Lanham Act trade-dress protection?").
141. Id at 127 (citing "the testimony of Samara's Vice-President for sales that Samara chose to
design its line of spring/summer seersucker children's clothes using consistent design elements so that
the look would be identified with Samara, building brand loyalty. Samara has produced this very same
product line for years, and it represents, according to the witness's testimony, 'the core [of Samara's]
business' and the 'lifeblood of the company").
142. Id. at 125-27 ("design elements in the record, from designer Kathy Gosda's testimony,
included the typical use of: seersucker fabric; large bold appliques; large collars with the appliques
generally integrated into the collar and any pockets on the garment; general absence of printed images,
black outlines, alphanumeric characters, three-dimensional features or heavy ornamentation (such as bibs
or fringe) which are frequently used in children's clothing; and full-cut, one-piece conservative bodies").
The court found this showing to be sufficiently detailed, though even the plaintiff could not readily
identify its own trade dress; it also relied on the testimony of a Wal-Mart buyer who recognized the
Samara "look." Compare id. at 133-35 (Newman, J., dissenting in part) (noting that Samara "look" was
both common and indistinct, and was not even consistently used across product line).
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prohibition on the protection of product configurations absent a showing ofsecondary
meaning.
In sum, courts can and have successfully employed the traditional trademark
categories in assessing trade dress claims, including those invo!ving product
configurations. The case law and statutory scheme of the Lanham Act mandate that
marks be categorized in accordance with their source-indicating capacity. Although
it is unclear whether courts must adhere strictly to the Abercrombie "spectrum of
distinctiveness," the Lanham Act itself requires all marks to be classified in one of
three outcome determinative ways. Marks that are generic or functional are not
entitled to trademark protection under any circumstances. This fundamental rule
preserves competition in the marketplace by insuring that all firms have access to
common terms that identify products or services themselves and to the functional
features of the products. Marks that are descriptive are not entitled to trademark
protection unless they have attained secondary meaning. This traditional trademark
rule, particularly when combined with the fair use defense, preserves the ability of
firms to use descriptive terms unless they have come to signify a source. Finally,
marks that are inherently distinctive are automatically eligible for trademark
protection. Providing immediate protection for these marks does not hinder
competition, as there is a potentially infinite number of such marks available. Indeed,
the Court Two Pesos recognized that such a rule may foster competition because
small businesses frequently do not have the resources to establish secondary meaning
in the short run. The Supreme Court's decision in Samara prematurely dismissed the
possibility that a product configuration could be shown to be inherently distinctive
by making use of traditional trademark analysis. Nonetheless, product configurations
that do have source-indicating capacity can still be protected as trademarks upon a
showing of secondary meaning. The Court's prophylactic rule, though inconsistent
with the language and structure of the Lanham Act, will quell some litigation
regarding product configurations while still leaving room for protection upon a
showing of secondary meaning.
2. Functionality
An important doctrine, drawn from the common law, that serves as a limiting
principle in trade dress cases is the doctrine of functionality. Although it now has a
statutory pedigree, by virtue of the 1998 Trademark Amendments, 43 the doctrine of
functionality also has a long history in the common law of trademarks. As the
Supreme Court indicated in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., in order for
trademarks or trade dress to be protected under the Lanham Act, it must not be
143. Pub. L. 105-330 expressly incorporated the functionality doctrine in the Lanham Act. As to
burdens of proof, "[iun a civil action for trade dress infringement... for trade dress not registered on the
principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter
sought to be protected is not functional." Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3)).
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functional.'" The Court in Qualitex recognized that "[t]he functionality doctrine
prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm's
reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to
control a useful product feature.' 4' Thus, as a matter of accepted trademark doctrine,
"the functionality doctrine marks the boundaries of trade dress protection."" In
other words, the functionality doctrine serves as the line of demarcation between the
sphere of trademark protection - which is limited to non- functional aspects of a
product or service - and utility patent protection, which offers a temporary monopoly
on the underlying useful article itself. Were trademark law to encompass the
functional aspects of a product or service, it would in effect provide a perpetual
monopoly on those elements, creating a conflict with the entire system of patent
protection and potentially exceeding the scope of congressional power, in light of the
Patent & Copyright Clause. 47 That Clause provides Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."'' 4 In effect, the doctrine of functionality is a way to prevent what
Milton Handler described as the ability of latecomers to "share in the good will of a
product but not in the good will of the producer."'4 9
These general principles are largely undisputed. Their application to the trade
dress arena, on the other hand, is the subject of considerable debate. There is also
disagreement regarding the precise definition of functionality.5 0 Further, the courts
have not agreed on whether it is the trademark owner/plaintiff's burden to show that
its claimed mark is non-functional, or whether the defendant must prove functionality
as an affirmative defense, though Congress has now provided guidance on this
issue. " 1
The Court has had several occasions to discuss the definition of functionality, but
has never formulated a precise definition. In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc.,"' the Court was not squarely presented with a functionality issue,
but nonetheless stated that a functional aspect of a product is one that "is essential to
the use or purpose of the article or... affects the cost or quality of the article."
Qualitex reiterated that a product feature is non-functional if it is not "essential to the
144. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992). The Court did not adopt
a definition of ftnctionality, but noted that the Fifth Circuit views a design as functional "if it is one of
a limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors and free competition would be
unduly hindered by according the design trademark protection." Id. at 775 (citing Sicilia Di R. Biebow
& Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 1984)).
145. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164,
146. l.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 1998).
147. See I J. THOMAs MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §7:64
(4th ed. 1996) (hereinafter "MCCARTHY") (trademark protection for functional features would clash with
the objectives of patent law).
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
149. Handler, supra note 98, at 1i.
150. See Welkowitz, supra note 94, at 331-43 (arguing that the functionality doctrine is ill- defined
and does not serve as a sufficient limit on product configuration claims).
151. See supra note 143.
152. 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.l (1982).
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use or purpose of the article" and does not "affect the cost or quality of the article." 3
The court further indicated that the functionality issue turns in part on whether
granting protection to a mark "would permit one competitor.., to interfere with
legitimate (non-trademark-related) competition through actual or potential exclusive
use of an important product ingredient."'"
Lower courts and commentators have struggled to define functionality. According
to McCarthy, "'functional' features or designs should be defined as those that are
driven by practical, engineering-type considerations such as making the product work
more efficiently, with fewer parts and longer life, or with less danger to operators, or
be shaped so as to reduce expenses of delivery or damage in Fhipping.' 5"3 Chief
Judge Posner, in W. T. Rogers Co. v. Keene," noted that the functionality doctrine "is
intended to screen out from the protection of trademark law certain design features
even if they have become so far identified with the manufacturer of a particular brand
that consumers may be confused about the origin of the good if another producer is
allowed to adopt the feature." To permit trademark protection on functional features
would result in "a product monopoly, and not a product monopoly for a term of years
as under the patent laws but forever.""' Thus, the factual question to be is resolved
is "whether the feature for which trademark protection is sought is something that
other producers... would have to have to have as part of the product in order to be
able to compete effectively in the market ... or whether it is the kind of merely
incidental feature which gives the brand some individual distinction but which
producers of competing brands can readily do without."'58 According to the First
Circuit's decision in I.P. Lund: "The crucial inquiry is into the effect that granting
protection will have on the opportunity of others to compete."'59
The burden of proof presents an important question that can have important
consequences for trademark law and for competition. Henry Maine once stated that
substance is secreted in the interstices of procedure"W - the burden of proof matters.
It matters for several reasons. First, as always, in a close case the fact-finder may rely
on the burden of proof to resolve an issue. Second, the burden of proof is a way in
which to allocate the risk of court error, whatever its source, including evidentiary
shortcomings.
Courts had been split on whether the plaintiff/trademark owner must prove that its
mark is non-functional, or whether the defendant must establish functionality as an
affirmative defense. The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
153. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (quoting Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 850 n. 10).
154. Id. at 170.
155. MCCARTHY, supra note 147.
156. 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir.1985).
157. Id. at 339.
158. Id.
159. I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 1998).
160. HENRY MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUsTOM 389 (1886) ("So great is the
ascendancy of the law of actions in the infancy of courts ofjustice, that substantive law has at first the
look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure.").
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Circuits had held that the plaintiff bears the burden on the issue,16 1 while the Second,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had found the burden rests with the defendant. 62
Although most circuits had addressed the burden of proof issue, it is striking that they
often did so with little attention to the language and structure of the Lanham Act, to
common law principles, or to the policy considerations inherent in this determination.
Perhaps the best policy discussion of the question can be found in the First Circuit's
decision in .P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co. 163 There, the court found that
considerations of policy warranted the imposition of the burden of proof on the
plaintiff:
We hold that the party alleging trademark infringement and dilution bears the burden
of proving non-functionality of those elements of the physical object that the plaintiff
claims constitute the mark and for which the plaintiff is seeking protection. Several
rationales support the burden being placed on those seeking protection, here the plaintiff.
Functionality, or, more precisely, a showing of non-functionality of the elements for
which protection is sought, is an essential component of the protection the law gives to
trademarks and trade dress. A showing of non-functionality is essential because the
doctrine prevents trademarks from limiting legitimate competition. Put differently,
"functionality" plays an important role in preventing a constitutional problem between
the Lanham Act and patent law. Moreover, Congress did not intend to provide Lanham
Act protection to functional aspects of products, and thus it would be anomalous if the
burden were not placed on the party seeking protection. Such an assignment of the
burden of proof ensures that trademarks serve their intended purpose of identifying
product sources. '
The First Circuit-also highlighted the danger of court error, noting that trademark
owners might attempt to seek protection for functional elements of their products in
the hope that the defendants will fail to overcome the burden of proving
functionality. 65 The court's concern seems well-placed, as the trademark owner
would have a strong incentive to invest resources in litigation if it thought that it
could secure patent-like rights in a functional component of its product. In effect,
placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff reduces the chance that trademark owners
will engage in rent-seeking behavior.
161. See l.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27,37 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that burden
of proof is on plaintiff); Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246,251 (5th Cir. 1997) (same),
cert. denied, I 18 S.Ct. 1795 (1998); Woodsmith Publ'g Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th
Cir. 1990) (same); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); AmBrit,
Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11 th Cir. 1986) (same); Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co.,
758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 747 F.2d 844,
854 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); see generally I MCCARTHY, supra note 147, § 7:72 (discussing division among
courts on the issue).
162. Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
defendants bear the burden of proof of functional ity); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,
520 (10th Cir. 1987) (same); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
163. 163 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 1998).
164. Id. at 37-38.
165. Id. at 38.
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Although the First Circuit's approach correctly identifies important policy
considerations that warrant placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff, the approach
suggested here would first require analyzing the overall statutory scheme and
common law background in trademark law. This analysis, which courts had not used
in resolving the burden of proof question,"~ strongly suggests the following
resolution: unless the trade dress is registered and has become incontestable, the
plaintiff should bear the burden of proof on the issue of functionality. Congress has
now made this first point clear (at least prospectively) in the 1998 amendments, as
mentioned above. Ordinarily, a trademark owner bears the burden of proof of the
validity of its mark. The Lanham Act provides that federal registration of a mark is
prima facie evidence of its validity. 67 Thus, even if a mark is registered, the burden
remains on the plaintiff to show that it is valid, but the plaintiff has the benefit of a
prima facie showing by virtue of the Lanham Act. If a mark has become incontest-
able, however, the range of grounds upon which the mark can be challenged is
narrowed considerably. Nonetheless, even an incontestable mark can be challenged
on ground of functionality.'" At this point, however, the burden of proof falls
squarely on the defendant. Placing the burden on the defendant at this point seems
fair, given that the mark has been successfully registered and defended for at least
five years.
The functionality doctrine serves as an important bulwark against undue expansion
of trademark protection, particularly in the trade dress area. A commonly raised
scenario involves a functional feature that has attained secondary meaning through
the success of the product - and perhaps by virtue in part of a patent monopoly. The
functionality doctrine would suggest that, despite the recognition of origin and other
indicia of secondary meaning with regard to the product, the functional elements of
that product cannot be trademarked."' For example, suppose the trademark owner
is the first to invent and market a particular shape of faucet or stove. The seller may
even possess patents on some aspects of the product configuration. Given the
monopoly the firm has on the faucet or stove design, it is likely that consumers will
come to recognize many product features of the faucet or stove as having originated
with the firm. Nonetheless, the firm is not entitled to perpetual trademark or trade
dress protection for the functional features in the product design. Thus, once the
patent expires, competitors are free to imitate all functional features of the product,
so long as they do not also imitate the non-functional trademark features. "0 This is
166. See, e.g., id. at 37 ("The Lanham Act itself provides no guidance on the issue, and the caselaw
contains little discussion of the rationale for allocating the burden of proof to plaintiffs or defendants.").
167. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a).
168. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b).
169. See LP. Lund, 163 F.3d at 38-39 (citing Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc.,
626 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1980)). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 7:66.
170. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989) ("For almost one
hundred years, it has been well established that in the case of an expired patent, federal patent laws do
create a federal right to 'copy and use.'").
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precisely the result the Federal Circuit reached in Elmer v. ICC Fabricating Inc., '7
in which it held that the plaintiff's vehicle-mounted advertising signs, which were
also the subject of utility and design patents, consisted of primarily functional and
unprotectable elements. The alleged trade dress features of the signs made it
aerodynamic, allowed drivers to see through them, and maximized visibility to the
public.
Theodore Davis has suggested that the doctrine of functionality is not only
consistent with the Lanham Act, but that it would in any case be constitutionally
mandated - providing potentially perpetual protection for functional aspects of trade
dress would directly conflict with the "limited times" requirements of the Patent
Clause.'2 Davis is very likely correct to suggest that such a constitutional problem
would arise and probably would be decisive, yet the courts have adhered to the non-
functionality requirement in language and generally (though not always) in spirit.
Davis notes that there may be just such a constitutional conflict, however, if
trademark owners are permitted to obtain trade dress protection for functional features
that are combined into an overall design that is primarily non-functional.'" In this
situation, Davis argues persuasively, the copyist is liable only if it takes non-
functional elements, separate and apart from any functional features.7 4
Welkowitz argues more fundamentally that the functionality doctrine is ill-defined
and does not serve as a sufficient constraint on the assertion of trademark claims
involving product configurations. 7 ' Although this concern is a valid one, the results
in actual, litigated cases have generally not borne out the validity of this perceived
danger. The doctrine is frequently invoked, and quite often successfully so,
particularly in product configuration cases. There are difficult and close cases, such
as W. T. Rogers, which involved hexagonal-shaped stacked office trays ("in boxes").
The court ultimately determined that fact issues were presented as to whether the
design served a functional purpose, even if that purpose was largely aesthetic, or
whether it was a source-identifier. Judge Posner concluded that the functionality
determination should hinge on whether the feature is necessary to allow effective
competition in the market or whether it is an incidental feature. Posner suggests that
even an aesthetic design feature can well be functional if it is necessary in order to
allow effective competition. 7 6
171. 67 F.3d 1571, 1578-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See also Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995) (patent law prohibits trade dress protection on product
configuration that involves a "significant inventive aspect" and that is subject of a utility patent).
Compare Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 288-91 (7th Cir. 1998) (no per se
prohibition on trademark protection for nonfunctional aspects of product that were disclosed but not
claimed in an expired utility patent); Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516-17 (9th Cir.
1989) (nonfunctional aspects of product protectable even after expiration of utility patent).
172. Davis, supra note 91, at 642-43 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141,146 (1989)).
173. Id. at 627, 637-52.
174. Jd at652.
175. Welkowitz, supra note 94, at 331-43.
176. 778 F.2d at 345-48.
[23:3/4
HeinOnline  -- 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 276 1999-2000
2000] TRADEMARK DILUTION, TRADE DRESS, & PRODUCT CONFIGURATION 277
3. Likelihood of Consumer Confusion
The third doctrinal constraint on trade dress claims is the requirement that the
plaintiff show a likelihood of consumer confusion. This requirement is embedded in
the common law background and statutory framework of the Lanham Act, and most
trade dress owners will not be able to claim protection under the Dilution Act as they
will probably be unable to make the requisite showing of fame. Thus, a careful
weighing of the likelihood of confusion factors is both necessary and desirable.
Contrary to the view expressed by some commentators,'" the required showing of
consumer confusion does serve as an important limitation on trade dress claims,
particularly those involving product configurations. The case of L.A. Gear, Inc. v.
Thorn McAn Shoe Co., n illustrates the point. In that case, the court addressed design
patent and trade dress claims involving a line of athletic shoes. The Federal Circuit
upheld the design patent claim but overturned the trade dress claim on the ground that
there was an insufficient showing of a likelihood of confusion. Significantly, the
court viewed the presence of the defendant's source-indicating labels and trademarks
as dispelling any potential confusion that the similarity of the shoe designs would
otherwise cause, particularly when combined with the different sales channels in
Which the products were sold. 79 In quite a number of instances, any potential
confusion attributable to the similarity of trade dress and product configurations, like
those in L.A. Gear, will indeed be dispelled by prominent labelling and by the
difference in sales channels.Ir °
A careful assessment of the likelihood of confusion is essential. One important
difficulty is the weight to be accorded to evidence that the alleged infringer
"intentionally" copies the plaintiff's mark. Courts should avoid giving too much
weight to this factor. If the mark involved consists of a product configuration, courts
should be wary of assuming that imitation is undesirable. In particular, if a court has
erroneously found a product configuration to be source indicating or where this
conclusion is at least doubtful, then according too much weight to this factor in the
confusion analysis will lead to overprotection. In the copyright context, the Supreme
177. See Lemley, supra note 89, at 1701; Welkowitz, supra note 94, at 321-30.
178. 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
179. Id at 1130-35. As this case illustrates, contrary to the view expressed by Klieger and others,
trade dress protection is not coextensive with design patent protection. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark
Dilution: the Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 789
(1997). The confusion element places a real and quite demanding burden upon the plaintiff.
180. Moreoever, quite a few cases have found no likelihood of confusion in product configuration
cases. See, e.g., International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1993) (no
likelihood of confusion in trade dress of audio speakers); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189 (3d
Cir. 1995) (reversing finding of confusion as to design of control valves for oil-drilling rigs); Oddzon
Productions, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (no likelihood of confusion as to trade
dress on toys); Big Top U.S.A., Inc. v. Wittem Group, 1998 WL 84582, at 053-54 (D. Mass. 1998) (no
likelihood of confusion as to giant-sized vending machines that dispense gumballs); Central Tools, Inc.
v. Products Eng'g Corp., 936 F. Supp. 58 (D.R.I. 1996) (trade dress in tools has acquired secondary
meaning and was non-functional, but defendant's products did not create likelihood of confusion); Doff-
Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996) (no likelihood of confusion as to "clamshell"
design of corn starch washers).
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Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.'l and Harper & Row v. Nation Enter-
prises' has cautioned against giving excessive weight to any one factor in a
balancing test, in those cases with regard to the fair use analysis.
Courts analyzing whether there is a likelihood of confusion should take into
account this cautionary note. The Second Circuit's decision in Samara Brothers, Inc.
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,' 3 recently reversed by the Supreme Court, again illustrates
the problem. Compounding the court's erroneous intent-based analysis of the
distinctiveness of Samara's seersucker garments, the court held that Wal-Mart's
"intentional" copying of the Samara style gave rise to a presumption of consumer
confusion.'" Although it is true that the court was reviewing a jury finding of
confusion, it made no effort whatsoever to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to support a showing under the eight-factor likelihood of confusion analysis;
instead, the court focused solely on the fact that Wal-Mart's buyers intended to copy
the Samara look. This point begs the question, particularly given the dubious finding
of distinctiveness, and demonstrates a failure to engage in the type of balancing that
the confusion analysis mandates and the Supreme Court in Campbell and Harper &
Row found to be necessary in the copyright context. The court thus failed to
distinguish between a deliberate effort to imitate (and confuse) and a deliberate effort
to compete.""
III. THE TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT AND
THE GROwTH OF DILUTION DOCTRINE
A. THE DILUTION STATUTE
The second principal area of expansion in trademark law is in the field of
trademark dilution. Commentators have made a varicty of arguments in criticizing
the dilution theory. Milton Handler has suggested that the addition of a federal
remedy for dilution will lead to excessive litigation, and that state dilution remedies
should be constrained or narrowly interpreted.I" Mark Lemley describes dilution as
the "most obvious example of doctrinal creep in trademark law," noting instances in
which its precepts have been misapplied.' Robert Klieger has argued that the
Trademark Dilution Act fails to focus on the concept of consumer protection (i.e., the
avoidance of purchaser confusion) and instead provides "trademark rights in gross for
at least some marks," which he views as a threat to efficiency and consumer
181. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
182. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
183. 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
184. Id at 127 ("'Consumer confusion' may be proved directly by evidence of actual consumer
confusion or indirectly by a showing that the copier intended to deceive consumers as to the source of the
goods. Intentionally deceptive conduct thus serves as a proxy for actual consumer confusion, raising a
rebuttable legal presumption that the actor's intent to confuse will be successful.").
185. Id at 127 (quoting George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532,1536 (2d Cir. 1992)).
186. See Handler, supra note 98, at 10-11 & n.33; Milton Handler, Are State Antidilution Laws
Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269 (1985).
187. Lemley, supra note 89, at 1698-99.
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welfare.' Klieger offers two proposed solutions to the problem he perceives, one
an unrealistic solution at least at this point and the other a troubling one for statutory
interpretation: "Unless these state statutes and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act are
repealed or read into obscurity by the courts, trademark law's historic balance
between free and fair competition will falter, undermining market efficiency and
consumer welfare."'8 9
To the extent the scholarly criticism reflects dissatisfaction with the mere existence
of dilution claims, the reality is that dilution theories are here to stay. The concept
of dilution has gained growing legislative acceptance since Frank Schechter proposed
it in 1927.190 Schechter recognized the informational and signaling value of
trademarks, and noted that a trademark owner can suffer harm when its marks are
used by others, even in the absence of competition or consumer confusion. Schechter
suggested that a trademark owner suffers cognizable harm whenever there is "a
gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind
of the mark or name by its use on non-competing goods. The more distinctive or
unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the
greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular
product in connection with which it has been used."'' Massachusetts adopted the
first trademark dilution statute in 1947, and about half the states eventually followed
suit."9 The Model State Trademark Act and Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition 93 both contained provisions for dilution.
The push for federal legislation strengthened as the number of states enacting
dilution provisions grew. There was a clear trend toward state endorsement of
dilution theories, and the continuing existence of a patchwork of protection for
trademarks warranted federal action. According to the House Report, a "federal
dilution statute is necessary because famous marks ordinarily are used on a
nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a patch-quilt
system of protection, in that only approximately 25 states have laws that prohibit
188. Klieger, supra note 179, at 789-90.
189. Id. Others opposed the enactment of the statute on a variety of grounds. See, e.g., Kenneth
L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433 (1994) (suggesting that proposed dilution state lacks sound philosophical
basis).
190. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis ofTrademark Protection, 40HARv. L. REv. 813(1927).
191. Id. at 825. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26,30 (IstCir. 1987) ("Anti-
dilution statutes have developed to fill a void left by the failure of trademark infringement law to curb the
unauthorized use of marks where there is no likelihood of confusion between the original use and the
infringing use.").
192. MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. I 10B, § 12 (West 1999) ("Likelihood of injury to business reputation
or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark registered under this chapter, or a mark valid at common
law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or
services."). At least three states - Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio - appear to recognize common law
claims of dilution. See Wynn Oil Corp. v. American Way Serv. Corp., 736 F.Supp. 746 (E.D. Mich.
1990); cf Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar's Palace, Inc., 490 F.Supp. 818 (D.NJ. 1980); United States
Playing Card Co. v. The Bicycle Club, 119 Ohio App. 3d 597, 695 N.E.2d 1197 (1997).
193. Model State Trademark Act § 12 (United States Trademark Association 1995); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1995).
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trademark dilution."'9 President Clinton signed the federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995 into law on January 16, 1996.' The Trademark Dilution Act created a new
provision, commonly known as section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. This provision
makes the following actionable: "The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled,
subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable,
to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution
of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection."'96
In order to prevail under the Trademark Dilution Act, the plaintiff must prove four
elements: (1) it owns a famous mark; (2) the defendant has made a commercial use
of a mark in interstate or foreign commerce; (3) the defendant's use of the mark
began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of a mark causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the plaintiff's mark by diminishing its capacity
to identify and distinguish goods and services.'"
Thus, today famous marks are entitled to federal protection against dilution under
section 43(c). Moreover, the Trademark Dilution Act did not preempt state dilution
statutes, although the impact and remaining role of these states laws is beyond the
scope of this article. In some respects it is troubling that Congress did not preempt
state dilution statutes when it enacted the Act, as this action would have fostered
uniformity and prevented expansive interpretations of state dilution law. Although
Congress did provide that a party owning a federally registered mark has a complete
defense to a state-law dilution action by a senior or other user, nothing in the
language of the statute can reasonably be interpreted as preempting the state
statutes. 198
The difficult question is how to interpret the Trademark Dilution Act in a manner
that is consistent with its language and purpose, while at the same time preserving
competition, maintaining low barriers to entry into markets, and offering some
guidance or certainty in the application of the new law. There has been perhaps
inevitable uncertainly in the early years of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, as
courts have struggled to ascertain its scope. Jerre Swann and Theodore Davis
contended that an antidilution statute was unnecessary, as the common law could
preclude uses that dilute distinctive marks.'" Some commentators, of course, have
194. H.R. Rep. No. 374, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N 1029,1030-31. Congress
enacted the FTDA in part to bring this country's law into conformity with international agreements. Id.
195. Pub. L. No. 104-98 (1996).
196. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)( 1999) (emphasis added).
197. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998).
198. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(3). The legislative history confirms that Congress did not intend a
wholesale preemption of state dilution statutes. See H.R.Rep. No. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1031; see also Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 890- 91 (8th Cir.
1998).
199. Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Dilution, An Idea Whose Time has Gone; Brand Equity
as Protectable Property, the New/Old Paradigm, I J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (1994). Compare Malla
Pollack, Time to Dilute the Dilution Statute and What Not to do When Opposing Legislation, 78 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 519 (1996) (arguing that Act lacks justification).
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taken a favorable view of dilution theory, often viewing trademarks as a form of
property entitled to protection from encroachment, even in the absence of competition
or confusion. ' °°
Although commentators have criticized the expansion of trademark law,
particularly in the areas of dilution and protection for trade dress, this expansion is to
some degree quite consistent with the statutory language of the Lanham Act, as it has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court, and of the Trademark Dilution Act. Thus,
barring congressional action, the search for boundaries and limits in trademark law
should focus on the statutory language, the overall purposes and common law
background of the statutory schemes, and principles of interpretation that the Court
has used in its trademark jurisprudence, as well as in intellectual property cases
generally. By applying these fundamental principles, overly expansive claims
involving trademark dilution and trade dress infringement can be constrained, while
allowing the courts to carry out the intent of Congress. Further, by grounding
trademark dilution and trade dress claims in these fundamental principles, the courts
can avoid impinging on the spheres of copyright and patent law. Thus, this article
suggests a middle ground between those who argue for drastic measures to constrain
trademark dilution and trade dress cases and those who seek to expand these doctrines
aggressively.
B. FAMOUS MARKS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION,
AND THE PURPOSE OF DILUTION THEORY
There are several areas in which fundamental principles can provide guidance and
boundaries in trademark dilution cases, particularly in assessing what constitutes a
famous mark eligible for protection under the Trademark Dilution Act and in
determining what the requisite showing should be for trademark dilution. There are
at least two ways in which trademark dilution law should have more clearly
delineated boundaries than are found in some recent decisions. First, the scope of
trademarks eligible for protection under the Trademark Dilution Act should be more
strictly limited to marks that have become famous. Second, there is a need for a
better definition of what constitutes dilution.
Trademark dilution presents a difficult challenge because there really is scant case
law addressing dilution, in contrast to trademark infringement law generally, which
has a long common law history. Prior to the 1995 Trademark Dilution Act, dilution
law was primarily a creature of state legislation, not common law precedent. Yet,
Frank Schechter's seminal article suggests the basic premise of trademark dilution as
protecting against "a gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold
upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use on non-competing goods. The
more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public
consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation
200. Rudolf Callman, Unfair Competition without Competition? The Importance of the Property
Concept in the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 443 (1947); Rose, supra note 79, at 682-730
(property rationales for dilution claims).
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from the particular product in connection with which it has been used."20 1 As
Schechter suggests, it is distinctive or unique marks that are entitled to protection
against dilution, and the degree of protection afforded depends on its market
recognition. Thus, fundamental principles can be discerned from the origin and
purpose of the trademark dilution theory.
State dilution statutes protect highly distinctive marks, although a wider array of
marks may fall within their ambit than under federal law. The Illinois statute protects
famous marks and is largely identical to the federal provision.2 2 The New York
dilution statute, in contrast, states:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a
mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a
mark registered or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source
of goods or services. 3
The California dilution statute is written even more expansively, and hence appears
to protect a broader class of marks than the federal law. 21 Thus, although not every
state dilution statute is so limited, state dilution laws predominantly protect famous
marks. For example, in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, US.A.,
Inc.,2°" the Second Circuit rejected a dilution claim asserted by the owners of the
Lexis legal research database against the then-nascent Lexus division of Toyota. The
court noted that the "plaintiff's mark must possess a distinctive quality capable of
dilution.' 2"e The court held that the requirement of distinctiveness would be met only
in the case of a strong mark, either in terms of uniqueness or acquired secondary
meaning. "In sum, the statute protects a trademark's 'selling power.""'20 Crucially,
the court found that, under New York law, dilution claims cannot be asserted based
on "selling power in a limited geographical or commercial area."2' s
Applying the New York law's distinctiveness requirement, the Second Circuit
concluded that Mead's Lexis brand name was recognizable only among lawyers and
accountants, in contrast to only one percent recognition of the mark among the
general public. Without broader market recognition, there was no danger that
consumers would associate the defendant's automobiles with the plaintiff, and hence
201. 1d. at 825.
202. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1036/6 & 65 (West 2000).
203. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney/Gould/Consol. 1999)
204. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1999) ("Likelihood of injury to business reputation
or ofdilution ofthe distinctive quality of a mark registered under this chapter, or a mark valid at common
law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or
services.").
205. 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
206. Id. (citing Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 399
N.Y.S.2d 628, 369 N.E.2d 1162 (1971)).
207. Id.
208. Id. Compare the analysis under federal law, infra notes 210-229 and accompanying text.
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there was no selling power in the plaintiff's brand name which might be diluted by
the defendant's mark.2'
The Trademark Dilution Act explicitly limits its remedies to cases of "dilution of
famous marks" and to the "owner of a famous mark."21 Given the difference in
language between the federal law and the law in many states, including New York
and certainly California, it is clear that only a narrow segment of marks will qualify
for federal protection. The statute specifically identifies eight non-exclusive factors
to be considered in evaluating whether a mark is famous:
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors
such as, but not limited to-
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 188 1, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
211
In assessing how to apply this test, courts in dilution cases should take some
guidance from Supreme Court interpretation of other multiple-factor tests in
intellectual property statutes. The most obvious example is the four-factor fair use
test in copyright law.2" 2 The Court's decisions in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
209. ld. at 1030-31.
210. 15 U.S.C. § 1025(c).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
212. 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, 0 for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding
is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
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Inc.23 and Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises214 offer some guidance in this regard.
In both cases, the Court held that a careful balancing of the facts of each case is
required to determine whether a particular use is fair. For example, in Campbell, the
Court stated: "The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute.
. calls for case-by-case analysis. Nor may the four statutory factors be considered
in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed
together, in light of the purposes of copyright."2"5 Thus, in the copyright context, the
Court specifically rejected any evidentiary presumptions, or short-cuts, in the fair use
analysis - in Campbell rejecting a presumption that all commercial uses are unfair
and in Harper & Row refusing to presume that all news reporting constitutes fair use
(or that all commercial uses are unfair). 216
Courts should analyze the eight factors in section 43(c) of the Lanham Act in the
same manner as the Court has suggested in its copyright jurisprudence. Thus, courts
should engage in a careful case-by-case analysis of each claim that a trademark is
famous, at least where that issue is disputed by the parties. This task is not
particularly onerous. In fact, it is much less so than the copyright fair use analysis,
because every fair use case is different (even if it involves the same plaintiff and the
same copyrighted work), whereas a trademark - once adjudicated to be famous - is
likely to continue to remain famous absent abandonment, or a substantial change in
market circumstances or consumer perception, or genericide. Similarly, a mark that
is found to not qualify as famous would probably not be famous in later litigation,
unless circumstances have changed, such as dramatically enhanced market
recognition.
The determination of what constitutes a famous mark under the Trademark
Dilution Act is guided by the express language of the Act, principally its eight-factor
standard. It is in some ways striking that courts have not consistently and explicitly
applied these factors in their discussions of famous marks. Although any multi-factor
analysis will present difficulties in application, courts should at least explain how the
factors lead to the result being announced. A review of cases decided since the 1995
Trademark Dilution Act took effect reveals that courts have not consistently followed
this case-by-case balancing approach in assessing whether a mark is famous and thus
entitled to protection against dilution. Although some courts have followed the
mandated approach, others have emphasized one or two factors or have failed to
discuss the issue in any depth. In TeleTech Customer Care Management, Inc. v. Tele-
Tech Co.,2 the court found the "TeleTech" mark "probably" famous based on a brief
and unpersuasive discussion, including mention of hundreds of thousands in
advertising dollars, recognition and sales in the telephone-internet service industry,
listing on NASDAQ, use since 1982, and federal registration. The court in
213. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
214. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
215. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
216. Id at 578-82; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-63.
217. 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997). See also Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Willitts Designs
Int'l, Inc., 1998 WL 341618, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (finding Ebony magazine to be a famous mark, no
doubt correctly, but with limited discussion and analysis, particularly given evidence of third-party uses).
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Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen,211 found that the Intermatic mark was famous based
primarily on its inherent distinctiveness, registration, and fifty years of use.
Commentators have criticized a number of other decisions that found a mark
famous. 21 9 In Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, ° the court addressed whether the Wawa mark,
under which a chain of convenience stores in five middle Atlantic states operates, was
a famous mark. Wawa had a stronger case than the commentary would suggest. It
operated over 500 stores in its regional market, had a $6 million advertising budget,
owned an incontestable registered mark, and had been in operation for 90 years; the
defendants opened their"HAHA" convenience store in the same market area, as there
were 10 Wawa stores in the general vicinity. " ' Moreover, although the court did not
rely on this fact, Wawa is a fairly distinctive term for a convenience store and was not
used by third parties in other markets. Some cases that have been the subject of
criticism have either been overruled or otherwise should have limited precedential
impact.t W
On the other hand, the court in Breuer Electric Manfucturing Co. v. Hoover Co.'
held that the Tornado mark, used in the commercial floor cleaning business, did not
have sufficient recognition outside its narrow market area to be deemed a famous
mark for purposes of federal law. This decision harks back to the MeadData Central
case, which similarly held that the Lexis mark was not sufficiently recognizable
outside the field of legal research to preclude the use of Lexus on luxury automobiles.
218. 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996). See also Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon
Sciences Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995, 1998 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (conclusory finding of fame).
219. See Lemley, supra note 89, at 1698-99 (arguing that courts "have been quite willing to
conclude that a local favorite, or a rather obscure company, is 'famous'" and noting that "marks such as
Intermatic, Gazette, Dennison, Nailtiques, TeleTech, Wedgewood (for new homes, not china), Papal Visit
1999, and Wawa have been declared famous"); see also Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Comment, Judicial
Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 659, 669-70 (1998)
(generally criticizing courts' failure to analyze famousness of marks and summarizing cases that failed
to do so).
220. 1996 WL 460083, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afdper curiam, 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cit. 1997).
221. Id. at 1-4.
222. Lemley, supra note 89, at 1698-99 & n.50, was correct as to the Dennison district court ruling,
which was later reversed on appeal. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999)
(weighing factors and concluding that Avery and Dennison marks are not famous, given that they are
surnames and are used in narrow markets, and have only moderate recognition; significant third-party use
was also shown). Lemley and Krafle- Jacobs correctly note that the Gazette case failed to analyze fame
properly. That case was also an ordinary trademark infringement case, and the court appears to have
confused the two concepts in holding that the plaintiff's family of Gazette newspapers in Maryland was
diluted. See Gazette Newpapers, Inc. v. The New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688 (D. Md. 1996) (holding
that Gazette is descriptive term for newspaper, finding secondary meaning, trademark infringement, and
dilution). See Lemley, supra note 89, at 1698-99 & n.50; Krafie-Jacobs, supra note 219, at 609 n.324.
The case of Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377,381 (Ore. 1983) (Wedgwood home builders),
involved a state dilution statute that was interpreted as not requiring national fame, and hence it has little
bearing on the federal claim. Compare Lemley, supra note 89, at 1698-99 & n.50.
223. 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (N.D. III. 1998). See also Michael Caruso & Co. v. Esefan Enters., 994
F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that Bongo mark for apparel has not been used sufficiently
and is undermined by third-party uses, rendering it not famous); S Indus., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia
Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 21661 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that Stealth mark, used in computer video business,
was not famous, given limited amount and length of use and other factors).
HeinOnline  -- 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 285 1999-2000
COLUMBIA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
That case, decided under New York's dilution statute, recognizes the need to identify
marks which truly have selling power. As the First Circuit has recognized, "a great
deal more" is required to show that a mark is famous than would be required to
establish the secondary meaning required for ordinary infringement protection.24
Thus, some courts have erred in nearly equating the two concepts. As the Ninth
Circuit has observed, "[d]ilution is a cause of action invented and reserved for a select
class of marks - those marks with such powerful consumer associations that even
non-competing uses can impinge on their value." 5
Several rules of interpretation can be inferred from the statutory language of the
Trademark Dilution Act. First, a trademark may be eligible for protection based on
either its inherent distinctiveness or its acquired distinctiveness (secondary meaning)
or, presumably, both. Thus, a mark that initially was descriptive but which has
become well known and has acquired substantial secondary meaning, such as
"Greatest Show on Earth" or "Holiday Inn," might be entitled to very limited
protection from dilution, although the best case can be made for coined terms such
as Wawa and Intermatic.226 Second, the duration and extent of use is a factor, which
may explain some why marks such as those in the Intermatic decision may be entitled
to protection, even if they are not household names. 7  Third, the extent of
advertising and publicity clearly is an important factor. Fourth, courts should
consider the geographic area in which the plaintiff's mark is used. Accordingly, a
mark that is used on a nationwide, or world-wide, basis is more likely to be entitled
to protection, although strikingly there is no per se rule against protection for regional
or localized marks. Rather, the geographic scope of the mark is simply a factor in the
analysis, to be balanced with the others. Thus, in WA WA, the court balanced this
factor against the plaintiff's otherwise strong showing of fame, whereas the Star
Markets court found a lack of fame in light of the plaintiff's one-state market and
other factors. Fifth, the extent of third-party use is certainly significant, as a strong
224. Lund, 163 F.3d at 47.
225. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d 868. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25,
comment e (1995)("[A] trademark is sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by a nonconfusing use if the
mark retains its source significance when encountered outside the context of the goods or services with
which the mark is used by the trademark owner.").
226. See also American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 314-16 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(finding "Don't Leave Home Without It" marks to be famous given substantial use and recognition).
Compare Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 219, at 695 (noting stronger basis for dilution claim if mark is
coined).
227. In contrast, when a fairly common term has been used as a mark in only one state, albeit quiet
successfully, it does not qualify as famous. See, e.g., Star Mkt., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030
(D. Hi. 1996) (holding that Star Markets, a successful grocery chain located only in Hawai'i, was not
famous under the Dilution Act, and thus cannot prevent use of Texaco Star Marts, given that mark
involves common term, has been used by third parties in other markets, was unregistered and has only
been used in local area). A number of decisions have rejected dilution protection in cases of fairly
common marks that have been in use for short periods of time. See, e.g., King of the Mountain Sports,
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 968 F. Supp. 568, 577-78 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that hunting apparel maker's
"King of the Mountain" mark was not shown to have sufficient use outside narrow market, nor sufficient
recognition, to qualify as famous); Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340,
349-50 (D. N.J. 1996) (holding that drug store's "We'll take good care of you" mark was not famous,
given limited use for nine years and common nature of slogan).
[23:3/4
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argument can be made that a mark does not have unique selling power if it is widely
used by others, as in the Columbia University, Sports Authority, and Clue cases.228
Finally, courts should consider whether the mark has been registered under federal
law. Once again, it is important to note that this factor is one among many, and the
statute in no respect indicates that a mark is famous merely because it is registered.
Conversely, it is possible for a mark to be famous, but unregistered.2
By following these fundamental principles of interpretation, courts should be able
to address one of the major criticisms leveled against the Trademark Dilution Act -
that all manner of marks are being accorded broad protection against dilution, even
those that are not truly famous. On the other hand, the criticisms of some commenta-
tors - those who wish to impose per se rules or presumptions against protection of
certain types of marks - are clearly inconsistent with the language and purpose of the
statute. Although there is nothing wrong with taking this viewpoint, it is necessary
to acknowledge that this view is not at all consistent with the express language of the
Trademark Dilution Act and that the argument should be addressed to Congress, or
labeled as a generalized discussion of what the law should be.
C. DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF DILUTION:
ALL IS NOT SWEETNESS AND LIGHT
A second major area of debate regarding trademark dilution is the question of what
constitutes infringement of a famous mark by dilution. In other words, what is the
boundary or protected realm of famous marks. Not every use of a famous mark
necessarily dilutes that mark. On this issue, there is relatively little statutory
guidance, as the Act itself merely states that "[tihe owner of a famous mark shall be
entitled.., to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of
a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark .... "2
Giving meaning to trademark dilution theory is an important step in resolving the
uncertain boundaries of this relatively new claim. There are at least two approaches.
A majority of courts apply a "likelihood of dilution" analysis, frequently focusing on
the so-called "Sweet factors," named after Judge Sweet's concurring opinion in Mead
228. Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia Healthcare Corp., 964 F. Supp. 733,750 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (no dilution of the distinctiveness of Columbia University mark by defendant Columbia in the
health-care field, given third party use of the same or similar marks); Sports Authority, Inc. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 925, 941 (E.D. Mich.1997) (Sports Authority's trademark for
"authority" has been diminished by third party use and was "not so famous as to deserve protection under
the federal dilution statute"); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F.Supp.2d 117, 132 (D. Mass.
1999)(finding that Hasbro "has failed to establish that its [Clue] mark, which is a common word that
numerous third parties use, is famous and thus entitled to protection from dilution"); Star Markets, 950
F. Supp. at 1035-36 (noting third-party uses of Star Market weighs against fame of plaintiff's mark)..
229. Congress explicitly allowed for the protection of both registered and unregistered marks under
section 43(c), just as the other provisions of section 43 are applicable to both. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(protecting any mark).
230. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c) (emphasis added).
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Data Central.23 ' Others explicitly or implicitly require a showing of actual dilution.
The Fourth Circuit, for example, in Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development,232 required a showing that the
marks are sufficiently similar to cause a mental association and further that this
association will cause actual harm to the plaintiff. A blurring claim requires a
showing that the defendant's use of a substantially similar mark causes the plaintiff s
mark to lose its ability to serve as a unique indicator or identifier of the plaintiff's
product or service, i.e., to lose its selling power. Tamishment claims require a
showing that a famous mark is improperly associated with an inferior or offensive
product or service.2" In both instances, there is a showing of harm to the ability of
a famous mark to indicate a source and provide information as a result of being
associated with an unlicensed use.
An important question in assessing whether dilution has occurred is whether the
so-called Sweet factors developed in Mead Data Central provide the appropriate
conceptual framework. These factors are: (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the
similarity of the product markets covered by the marks; (3) the sophistication of
consumers; (4) the defendant's predatory intent; (5) the renown of the senior mark;
and (6) the renown of the junior mark. Courts and commentators are divided
regarding whether these factors appropriately and correctly define the boundary of
dilution claims.23 4 There is a strong argument that these factors too closely resemble
the ordinary likelihood-of-confusion analysis and fail to recognize the conceptual
difference between trademark infringement's focus on confusion of purchasers and
dilution theory's focus on harm to the selling power of the mark.23
It is important to require a strong showing of some actual harm through either
blurring or tarnishment. Thus, a claim by a trademark owner that any use of the same
or similar mark will constitute blurring should be rejected, though courts have done
231. See, e.g., Mead Data Central, 875 F.2d at 1031; Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Manny's
Porshop, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (noting likelihood of dilution standard and
suggesting that "even innocuous use[s]" are prohibited).
232. 170 F.3d 449, 452-53 (4th Cir. 1999).
233. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 452; Panavision Int'l, L.P.v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326
n.7 (9th Cir. 1998). An example of tamishment is the use of "Enjoy Cocaine" on a poster, which also
makes use of the Coca-Cola script and coloring. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Cf Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F.Supp.2d 639, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(holding that use of "Guns Are Us," "Guns are We," and "gunsareus.com" are sufficiently distinct as not
to tarnish or cause association with Toys "R" Us brand name).
234. See, e.g., Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring" Under the Federal Trademark
DilutionAct of1995, 36AM. Bus. L.J. 255,285-98 (1999) (arguing only the first Sweet factor is relevant
to blurring analysis); Welkowitz, supra note 94, at 358-66; see also Patrick M. Bible, Defining and
Quantifying Dilution under the Trademark Dilution Act oft 995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual
Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 295,311 (1999) ("[despite reliance on the test by many courts, the factors
do not adequately isolate the harm caused by dilution from the harm in a typical 'likelihood of confusion'
case and, to some extent, completely misapply the dilution concept"; suggesting that the similarity of
products and predatory intent factors are inappropriate).
235. See supra note 229 (citing criticisms of Oswald and Bible).
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so only inconsistently.236 There should be a demanding requirement of similarity, as
any significant alteration of the mark will dispel any association and any harm to the
selling power of the mark, as in Ringling Brothers. The similarity of markets issue
might have some bearing, as consumers are more likely to make an association
between say, an automobile mark used in connection with the sale of car polish as
compared to diapers, although courts must recognize that even the latter case can still
be actionable upon a proper showing. Consumer sophistication seems irrelevant, as
does predatory intent (which is specifically addressed in the statutory remedy
provision)2" and the renown of the defendant's mark. The renown of the plaintiff's
mark also appears to be a necessary condition for relief, and thus adds little to the
analysis.
What should be required is a showing that consumers in fact have or will make an
association between the plaintiff's famous mark and that of the defendant, and that
this association has or will undermine the mark's selling power and presence in the
marketplace. Further, it is important to give full consideration to the three defenses
Congress incorporated into section 43(c): fair use in comparative advertising,
noncommercial uses, and news reporting and commentary. Courts generally have
accorded due recognition of these defenses, for example, allowing a former Playboy
"Playmate of the Year" to identify herself as such and permitting (at least under
trademark law) a parody of the O.J. Simpson trial involving Dr. Seuss, entitled "The
Cat Not in the Hat."' ' 8
The control element is significant in both blurring and tarnishment cases, in that
allowing another party to use a famous mark places the control of that use in the
hands of a party that has not substantially invested in that mark and may not
maximize its value.39  To recover, however, it is important to establish that
consumers in fact will make the harmful mental association. In other words, proof
of actual dilution is necessary. This requirement is quite consistent with the language
of the Dilution Act, which differs from some state statutes that focus on a likelihood
of dilution, such as the New York statute."4 Such a requirement serves to limit
236. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 316 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(rejecting argument that any use of "Don't Leave Home Without It" marks would blur). Compare
Kimberly Knitwear, Inc. v. Kimberly Stores, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (W.D. Mich. 197 1) (implying
that any similar use "inexorably" causes dilution under state law); Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 219, at 693-
94 (noting several decisions that failed to undertake dilution analysis).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
238. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (fair use allows
former playmate may refer to herself as such); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., 924
F. Supp. 1559, 1573-74 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that parody was noncommercial use for purposes of
dilution act, but upholding copyright claim), af'd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
239. Cf Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Tocppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998) (use by another of
a famous mark placed the plaintiff's name and reputation at mercy of defendant).
240. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. A number of commentators have noted this
distinction, though with differing views on its significance. See Bible, supra note 234, at 311 (1999)
(actual dilution should be required); Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 219, at 667-68 (dilution required); Klieger,
supra note 179, at 840 (arguing that a likelihood of dilution requirement is more consistent with purpose
of dilution statute).
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dilution claims and avoid providing rights in gross or a monopoly on language.24'
Thus, requiring proof of actual dilution through blurring or tarnishment of a famous
mark is consistent with both the statutory language and the overall purpose of dilution
theory in the scheme of federal protection for trademarks. The plaintiff can prevail
under a dilution theory only if it can show harm to its selling power. And this type
of harm will not be clear in every case, as some uses might not diminish the plaintiff's
selling power. Hence the Fourth Circuit in Ringling Brothers held that Utah's use of
the phrase "The Greatest Snow on Earth" does not dilute the plaintiff circus' slogan,
the "Greatest Show on Earth."242 Significantly in that case, the defendant's use of its
slogan actually enhanced the recognition (and thus selling power) of the plaintiff's
slogan.243 Although this requirement will make it more difficult for trademark owners
to prevail in dilution cases, it is an important limiting principle that seems compelled
by the statutory language. The statute requires a showing that actual dilution has or
will occur, and accordingly a "likelihood of dilution" will not suffice.
241. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 452-56. The court later noted that some uses will not cause
harm, "whether for lack of exposure, general consumer disinterest in both marks' products, or other
reasons." Id. at 460.
242. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 462-63.
243. See id. at 463 (noting that plaintiff's slogan was recognized by 46% in Utah, where the
defendant had advertised its slogan, but only 41% elsewhere in the country). Similarly, a court found that
a bar may use the phrase "The Greatest Bar on Earth" without causing dilution of the circus mark.
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204,210-
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that use of common phrase to promote bar does not violate Dilution Act,
using a "likelihood of dilution" standard). Ringling Brothers' problem is that its phrase is simply too
common to be protected from highly disparate (and non-identical) uses by bars and travel departments.
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IV. DILUTION OF TRADE DRESS:
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, BOUNDARIES, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. THE APPLICABILITY OF DILUTION THEORY TO TRADE DRESS
AND PRODUCT CONFIGURATIONS
Last year, the Journal of Intellectual Property Law had a clever idea for a
symposium issue. The topic was "The Worst Intellectual Property Opinion Ever
Written." 2" One of the nominees, suggested by Paul Heald, was Sunbeam Products,
Inc. v. West Bend Co.245 In that case, the plaintiff Sunbeam claimed that the
defendant had unlawfully copied the trade dress of its Mixmaster stand mixer. The
lower court found that the plaintiff's design was distinctive and non-functional, and
that it was entitled to protection on the ground that there was a likelihood of consumer
confusion created by the defendant's sale of a similar mixer. What rankled Heald was
the court's dictum that the plaintiff's design was also entitled to protection under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act as a famous mark.2" The district court's decision
could quite reasonably be criticized for reaching an issue that was unnecessary to the
resolution of the case. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit wisely chose not to address the
dilution question. Heald's criticism, however, is more fundamental. In his view, the
decision "is dangerous not only because of its ultimately unhealthy holding, but
because of the unobtrusive and insidious manner in which it threatens to infect the
corpus of intellectual property law."247
The issue Heald raises is an important one regarding the interaction of the two
major bodies of trademark law discussed here, trade dress protection and trademark
dilution. Can trade dress qualify for protection under the Dilution Act? Heald
suggests that the answer is that it cannot and that if it did the result would be, to use
his term, "cancerous."24 This article addresses primarily the first of his objections.
Heald may well be correct that the application of dilution concepts to trade dress will
threaten the boundaries of trademark law, potentially exceeding Congress' power or
conflicting with patent law policies. Given the interpretive rules set forth here,
however, there is no statutory or decisional basis on which to establish a per se bar
to protection of trade dress under the Dilution Act.
First, Heald concedes, as he must, that there in nothing in the language of either
the Lanham Act or the Trademark Dilution Act that precludes protection for trade
dress against dilution. 49 His argument is that the legislative purpose of the Dilution
Act was merely to federalize state dilution law, and "no state ever applied its dilution
244. 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 397 (1998).
245. Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co.: Exposing the Malign Application of
the Federal Dilution Statute to Product Configurations, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 415 (1998). See Sunbeam
Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (S.D. Miss. 1996), affd in part, 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir.
1997).
246. Heald, supra note 245, at 415-16.
247. Id. at416.
248. Id. at 415 (the result illustrates the "broader cancer of over-expansive intellectual property
rights").
249. Id. at418-19.
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statute to protect product configuration."m He dismisses the legislative history's
silence on the issue as the result of the fact that Frank Schechter's 1927 article and
other discussions of dilution had not raised the possibility, and so there was no reason
to include language to preclude it.25' His principal basis for barring such protection,
however, is on a construction of the federal law generally. He suggests that allowing
product configurations to have protection against dilution would conflict with design
patent law. Although most of the force of his argument is drawn from the Sears-
Compco-Bonito Boats line of cases, these cases all dealt with federal patent law
preemption of state law and hence are not directly on point (as Heald
acknowledges).5 2 He views the application of dilution law to product configurations
as such a radical departure from the prior balance struck by Congress that it cannot
be assumed -"Given the history of the statute and the interpretive rationales provided
by a long line of preemption and registration cases preceding it, the word 'mark' in
15 U.S.C. § 1125( c) cannot possibly have been intended by Congress to include
product configurations. If 'mark' is construed as suggested herein, then the federal
patent and trademark laws will continue to rest comfortably together, as Congress
undoubtedly intended." 3
Although Heald's view that dilution law should not protect product configurations
is perhaps sound as a matter of general policy, it has no basis in the language and
structure of the Dilution Act and the Lanham Act, and little basis in the overall
intellectual property scheme Congress has enacted. Under the interpretive approach
set forth here, the per se disqualification of source-identifying, non-functional,
famous trade dress from the benefits of the Trademark Dilution Act does not pass
muster. Like other distinctions that have meet ignominious fates before the Supreme
Court - that a color alone cannot serve as a trademark in Qualitex, or that trade dress
cannot be inherently distinctive but rather must be proven to have secondary meaning
in Two Pesos - there is little basis for a product configuration carve-out in the
Dilution Act. It is probably a good idea not to have litigation over the dilution of
product configurations, and perhaps Congress should enact just such a limitation.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Samara provides some new support for Heald's
position, given the Court's concern regarding the competitive implications of
protecting product configurations. Nonetheless, Samara does allow for protection of
source-identifying product configurations upon a showing of secondary meaning, and
it does not address whether that configuration can ever attain a sufficient level of
recognition for protection under the Dilution Act'
Although Heald correctly observes that there appear to be no reported product
configuration trade dress dilution cases prior to enactment of the Trademark Dilution
Act late in 1995, he seems to understate the extent to which product packaging trade
250. Id. at419.
251. Id. at419-20.
252. Id at 425.
253. Id at 429.
254. 120 S. CL 1339 (2000).
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dress was litigated and sometimes protected.2"5  Thus, Heald's argument that
congressional intent can be divined from its understanding of state dilution law is
unpersuasive. It can be argued, instead, that the notion that dilution law. could apply
to trade dress in general was fairly well established and that the further extension of
it to product configurations in particular under either state law or the new federal
dilution law was quite clearly foreseeable. The failure of Congress to preclude such
protection under the Dilution Act can therefore justify application of that Act to any
trade dress that satisfies the Act's demanding prerequisites.
More fundamentally, it can also be argued that foreseeability does not matter when
the statute is written in broad terms. For example, in Diamondv. Chakrabarty,"s2 the
Supreme Court looked to the broad language of the Patent Act in rejecting a claim
that Congress did not foresee that the patent laws might be construed to apply to a
genetically engineering microorganism: "Our obligation is to take statutes as we find
them, guided, if any ambiguity appears, by the legislative history and statutory
purposes.... This Court frequently has observed that a statute is not to be confined
to the 'particular [applications] ... contemplated by the legislators.'" 2"
The Sears-Compco-Bonito Boats objection to trade dress protection for product
configurations is a serious and troubling one. A number of commentators have
highlighted the potential conflict between the broad notion of this line of decisions
- a federal right to copy - and the restriction of the right to copy that results when the
dilution concept is applied to product configurations. Indeed some courts and
commentators believed, even prior to enactment of the Dilution Act, that ordinary
trademark protection already posed such a conflict.25' Rochelle Dreyfuss, among
255. Heald acknowledges only two preexisting lower court opinions, which he states assumed
without discussion that state dilution law applied to trade dress, and he incorrectly states that New York's
dilution law did not recognize such a claim (relying on a 1983 district court opinion). Id at 417-18 &
nn.18-20. In fact, New York dilution law did protect trade dress, and quite explicitly so, before the late-
1995 enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. See Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53
F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (addressing successful trade dress dilution claim under New York law; 1994
published lower court opinion, including jury verdict, see 851 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), for one
opinion); Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc, 35 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (unsuccessful trade
dress dilution claim involving dictionaries, under New York law; failed on grounds of lack of sufficient
distinctiveness, but court did note that trade dress was capable of protection under state dilution act);
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033 (2dCir. 1992) (unsuccessful trade dress
dilution claim, under New York law, which failed on grounds of lack of sufficient distinctiveness);
NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990) (unsuccessful trade dress dilution claim
under New York law, which failed because court held that color-only marks were not entitled to
protection); Tetra Sales v. T.F.H. Publications, Inc., 839 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1988) (trade dress dilution
claim, under New York law, based on trade dress of pet books); Ben Berger & Son, Inc. v. American
Motorist Ins. Co., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (insurance coverage litigation discussing trade
dress dilution claim). There was also an unsuccessful product configuration dilution case tried before a
judge in mid-1995. See Judith Ripka Designs, Ltd. v. Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237,239 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(under New York dilution statute, line of "ancient inspired" jewelry was not inherently distinctive and
lacked secondary meaning).
256. 447 U.S. 303,314-18(1980).
257. Id.
258. See Gleiberman, supra note 94, at 2058-62; Welkowitz, supra note 94, at 299. Some courts
have also expressed this view. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971,977-78 (2d Cir. 1987)
(noting concern); Ferrari S.p.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991) (same) (Kennedy, J.,
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others, has expressed concern regarding the general scope of trade dress protection
and with the potential conflict with the Supreme Court's patent preemption
decisions. 2 9
Although commentators frequently rely on the Sears-Compco-Bonito Boats line
of decisions, these cases have only limited applicability to the issue of Lanham Act
protection for product configurations. As several courts and commentators have
argued or acknowledged, the principal import of these decisions involves preemption
of patent-like protections under state law.' This view seems correct. In Sears, the
Court addressed a claim by Stiffel that Sears' version of Stiffel's pole lamp had
infringed its federal patents and constituted unfair competition under state law. The
patents were found to be invalid but Stiffel prevailed on its state law claim. The
Court held that "[a]n unpatented article, like an article on which the patent has
expired, is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do
so."26' Similarly, the Court in Compco held that state unfair competition law could
not preclude copying of functional aspects of the plaintiff's flourescent lighting
system. To permit such relief would "interfere with the federal policy, found in Art.
I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain." 2
The Court in Bonito Boats had occasion to clarify the scope of the preemptive
sweep of the prior decisions. Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, noted
that "the broadest reading of Sears would prohibit the States from regulating the
deceptive similution of trade dress or the tortious appropriation of private informa-
tion."263 Significantly, the Court rejected that interpretation even as to state law:
"while Sears speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion that the States may place some
conditions on the use of trade dress indicates an implicit recognition that all state
regulation of potentially patentable but unpatented subject matter is not ispofacto
pre- empted by the federal patent laws."2' Rather, Sears prohibits the states from
offering patent-like protection for unpatented products or designs.26 Throughout this
discussion, the Court makes it clear that its focus is on the potential interference of
state law protections upon the federal patent scheme; thus Florida's prohibition on
direct-mold copying of boat hulls was found to be preempted.2' Justice O'Connor
dissenting).
259. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, We are Symbols and lnhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent?
Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 123, 134-43
(1996).
260. See, e.g., Ferrari S.p.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991); Welkowitz, supra
note 94, at 300-04 (noting that these cases involved preemption of state law but contending that they
nonetheless provide the lynchpin for evaluating possible encroachments upon federal patent law from
other federal statutes).
261. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
262. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237.
263. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 156-57.
266. Id at 156-57, 167-68.
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concluded: "It is for Congress to determine if the present system of design and utility
patents is ineffective in promoting the useful arts in the context of industrial
design." 7
These decisions, thus, do allow room for federal protection of various kinds,
including a specific statute governing industrial design and a general trade dress
protection law (which can encompass product configurations that have secondary
meaning and are thus source identifying). The real difficulty, then, is not with the
Sears-Compco-Bonito Boats line of decisions, as these decisions acknowledge that
Congress is free to regulate in this area. The conflict will be presented by the
argument that trademark law protection impermissibly provides potentially perpetual
protection for product designs in violation of the Patent Clause's "limited times"
provision.
It should be noted that, as a practical matter, few successful cases of product
configuration dilution are likely to arise, as the product configuration (or any trade
dress for that matter) must be proven to be protectable based on acquired distinctive-
ness (and on ground of either inherent or acquired distinctiveness in the case of trade
dress) and to be non-functional simply in order to receive protection under the
Lanham Act. Thus Kendall-Jackson's grape leaves, the Sak, Whimsicality's
costumes (including bumble bees, jack o'lanterns, frogs, turtles, ladybugs, and lions),
and the cover of Sports Traveler magazine all failed to meet the threshold requirement
of distinctiveness.2' So did the mission-style furniture in L. & JG. Stickley, Inc. v.
Canal Dover Furniture Co.269
To receive the further protections of the Dilution Act, the trade dress must be
famous and must be diluted in some fashion by the defendant's actions. It is probably
rare indeed to find examples of product configurations that are well-known enough
to be famous, and this article suggests that courts should enforce that standard
rigorously. In Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc.,27° which involved a claim of
dilution of product packaging trade dress (not a product configuration), the court held
that the plaintiff's peanut candy wrapper consisting of orange, brown, and yellow
colors was not famous, even though survey evidence showed that 94 percent of
consumers recognized the trade dress with the brand name obscured.
267. Id. at 168.
268. Each of these cases included trade dress dilution claims. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at
1045 (trade dress dilution claim fails because grape leaf is generic); Indonesian Imports, Inc. v. Old Navy,
Inc.,1999 WL 179680, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("The Sak" trade dress is generic); Whimsicality, Inc. v.
Battat, 27 F. Supp.2d 456,460-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (trade dress dilution and infringement claims fail as
costume manufacturer failed to show that costumes were distinctive); Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance
Magazine Publishers, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (magazine cover neither inherently
distinctive nor shown to have secondary meaning).
269. 79 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying Second Circuit's approach and finding trade dress not
protected and hence rejecting dilution claim).
270. 998 F. Supp. 500, 514-20 (M.D. Pa. 1998). The packaging was Reese's peanut butter cups.
Product packaging trade dress can be found to be famous and capable of protection under the Dilution
Act The influential case of Clinique Laboratories, Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 561-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), held that Clinique's trade dress was entitled to protection as a famous mark and that a
competitor's imitation of its packaging constituted dilution. The trade dress consisted of packaging for
Clinque's Basique line of skin care products.
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Further, most cases where the configuration has been found to be protectable (i.e.,
source indicating) and non-functional should be resolved under the traditional rules
of trademark law, upon a showing of likelihood of confusion, as in the Fifth Circuit's
Mixmaster decision in Sunbeam.27 The defendant's trade dress must also be
substantially similar to that of the plaintiff.2" In the few cases that might remain, the
plaintiff will be obligated to show that there is some real blurring or tarnishment,
either of which result in dilution of the mark's selling power.
The case law on the subject bears this point out. In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands,
Inc. ,273 the court found that Nabisco's "Goldfish" crackers were inherently distinctive
and famous marks2 4 The goldfish shape was also a federally registered, incontestable
trademark. The defendant marketed "CatDog" dog food, which included cheese
crackers in the shape of goldfish. The court noted that the presence of Nabisco's
goldfish-shaped crackers in the pet food mix would blur or weaken the immediate
recognition of the plaintiff's mark.2"'
Another good illustration of the use of dilution theory in a product configuration
case is Liquid Glass Enterprises, Inc. v. Porsche A. G. , 6 in which the court held that
the use of Porsche trademark and trade dress (including an image of the automobile
itself) in magazine and video advertisements for car polish constituted actionable
dilution. The defendant conceded that the Porsche mark and trade dress were famous,
but argued that no dilution had taken place. Although there was a naked woman
"discreetly" shown taking a shower in a scene in the defendant's video, the court did
not reach the issue of whether this association was tarnishing. It found sufficient
dilution through blurring, in that recurring uses of Porsche imagery would blur its
distinct presence in the marketY.
77
The case of Ferrari S.p.A. v. Roberts provides a good illustration of a weak
trademark infringement case that would be a good candidate for analysis under
dilution theory. In that case, Ferrari sought to prevent the sale of fiberglass kits that
replicated the exteriors of two limited-edition Ferrari vehicles, the Daytona Spyder
and the Testarossa. The defendant sold these kits to consumers, who obviously knew
they were not buying the real deal, and the kits would then be installed onto the
chassis of another vehicle. The kits did not bear the Ferrari name or logos. Given the
fame and distinctiveness of the Ferrari designs, there is a strong argument that it
should be able to prevent this type of use. And indeed dilution theory provides a
271. 123 F.3d at 259-60 & n.28 (finding trademark infringement and declining to reach dilution
claim).
272. See Winner Int'l v. Omori Enters., Inc., 1999 WL 669836, at *73-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(defendant's product found not to be substantially similar to trade dress of "The Club" line of anti-theft
devices for purposes of trade dress dilution claim).
273. 50 F. Supp.2d 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
274. Samara now precludes protection for a product configuration based on inherent
distinctiveness, see supra notes 52-57, but Nabisco undoubtedly could establish secondary meaning and
hence still receive trademark protection under present law.
275. Id. at 209-10.
276. 8 F. Supp.2d 398,404-05 (D.N.J. 1998).
277. Id. at 404.
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better avenue for this relief, as there is some argument that consumer confusion is
really quite unlikely on these facts.27
An important decision in this area of trade dress law is .P. Lund Trading ApS v.
Kohler Co.27 9 In that case, the plaintiff sold a kitchen and bathroom faucet under the
name VOLA. It was a distinctive product design that was widely recognized in the
high-end faucet mark and which was sufficiently unusual as to be on display in the
Museum of Modem Art's design collection. Kohler, the defendant, began producing
a similar faucet under its Falling Water brand.2 " The plaintiff pursued both trade
dress infringement and dilution claims for its faucet design. The lower court
concluded that the faucet (though not inherently distinctive) was protectable as trade
dress because it had acquired secondary meaning, but found no likelihood of
confusion. As to the dilution claim, the court found that the VOLA faucet was
famous and that Kohler's version had diluted its identity in the marketplace.2 '
The First Circuit addressed a number of important trade dress issues. As to fame,
the court held that showing trade dress to be famous for purposes of the Dilution Act
requires a much greater showing of source-indicating ability than is required in an
ordinary infringement case. The court also rejected use of the "Sweet" factors for
determining whether dilution had occurred, instead focusing on whether consumers
"will perceive the [parties'] products as essentially the same."28 2 Applying these
standards, the court found that the plaintiff's faucet design did not meet the
demanding fame threshold and that no dilution had been shown.2"3 This case
demonstrates the difficult course that a trademark holder must navigate in order to
assert dilution claims for product configurations. Finally, the Pebble Beach golf
course case, discussed above, included a trade dress dilution claim as well as an
ordinary infringement claim. The defendant's challenge to all ofthe plaintiff's claims
focused on the protectability of the trade dress, which the court found to be
descriptive but protected on the basis of strong secondary meaning. The defendant
did not appeal the finding that the plaintiff's trade dress was sufficiently famous to
support a dilution claim.2 Whether or not it would meet this standard, the Fifth
Circuit did not need to address the merits of the dilution claim, as the plaintiff was
able to obtain limited relief under traditional trade dress infringement principles.
As these cases illustrate, traditional trademark doctrine can sufficiently address
most trade dress cases under a standard infringement analysis. So long as courts
carefully apply the fame threshold and the dilution standard in those few cases where
these issues are presented, the fundamental policies of the Dilution Act can be
278. Dreyfuss, supranote255,at 134 (persuasively arguing that consumer confusion was not likely
in Ferrari even though the court had upheld a finding of confusion for purposes of the plaintiff's section
43(a) claim).
279. 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998).
280. Id. at 32.
281. Id. The plaintiff had not sought design patent protection. Id.
282. Id. at 33.
283. Id. at 46-50.
284. Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 546 n. 15.
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implemented without any serious threat to competition or to intellectual property
policy.
B. ADDRESSING THE REMAINING AREAS OF DoUBT
There are two real areas of concern in the application of dilution law to product
configurations. The first is the case of a firm with a famous mark consisting of a non-
functional product configuration. The firm brings suit against a competitor who has
imitated this product configuration, claiming both ordinary infringement and dilution.
If the plaintiff fails to prevail on its infringement claim because it could not establish
a likelihood of consumer confusion, can it circumvent this failing by asserting that
dilution theory fills the gap and provides a remedy? In other words, can the plaintiff
argue that even in the absence of confusion, there would be blurring or tarnishment?
The tarnishment case is not particularly problematic, because by definition it would
require a showing of some sort of unsavory association or harm to the plaintiff's
reputation. This additional element will rarely be provable. If it is shown, the
plaintiff should be entitled to relief under present law; one could view this showing
of tarnishment as akin to the "extra element" courts require of state law claims to
avoid preemption under federal patent or copyright law.2"' But what if the claim is
dilution by blurring - that the mere fact that the defendant is selling a product with
a similar product configuration dilutes the plaintiffs famous mark. Such a claim, if
permitted on this basis, would not only be an end-run around the confusion
requirement of traditional trademark law, but it would indeed give rise to design
patent-type protection for product configurations.
This problem can be avoided by a careful understanding and rigorous application
of the concept of dilution. Dilution is not simply a trademark infringement case
where the plaintiff cannot show confusion. If it were, there would be little need for
infringement claims as to any mark that qualifies for protection from dilution. In
other words, dilution law is not simply a short-cut around the confusion requirement
of traditional trademark and unfair competition law. Rather, it requires a showing of
some impermissible harm to the selling power of a mark. Courts could well conclude
that the owner of a famous product configuration who is unable to show consumer
confusion when faced with a competitor's replica or close imitation of its product
design is precluded from circumventing the confusion requirement by asserting that
the defendant's action nonetheless is actionable under dilution theory. Such an
285. Cases in which a competitor makes use of a mark in an unfavorable way for purposes of
commercial advertising (but not in truthful comparative advertising) might fall into this category.
Compare Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding state dilution
claim as to competitor's use of animated version of Deere's leaping deer logo, which "looks over its
shoulder, jumps through the logo frame (which breaks into pieces and tumbles to the ground), hops to a
pinging noise, and, as a two-dimensional cartoon, runs, in apparent fear, as it is pursued by the Yard-Man
lawn tractor and a barking dog" in defendant's commercial); see also Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. III. 1991) (beer manufacturer's spoof of Energizer Bunny trademark;
relief under Lanham Act and state dilution statute denied). A similar claim may thus arise as to source-
indicating configurations.
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approach has not been taken to date, but it may be one way to avoid the potential for
design patent-type protection for trademarked product configurations.
The benefit of this approach is that it does permit application of dilution law to
famous product configurations where the plaintiff can satisfy all of the elements
required by the Dilution Act. The trademark owner could assert dilution claims
involving non-competing but commercial uses of its trade dress, such a car polish
advertisement that makes use of Porsche automobiles or pet food that contains
goldfish-shaped crackers. This preserves the ability of the trademark owner to protect
the selling power of its mark and to control commercial uses of it even in the absence
of confusion - which is certainly the fundamental purpose of the Dilution Act. When
the trademark owner's claim is against a competitor, on the other hand, its failure to
show consumer confusion casts doubt upon the validity of its dilution claim. In order
to prevail, it would be required to show tarnishment, which could quite possibly exist
even in the absence of confusion, or some other element of dilution that this author,
at least, cannot presently anticipate. There would be no per se prohibition of product
configuration dilution claims, even against competitors, but the trademark owner
must persuade the court that it not merely seeking to avoid non-confusing copying of
its product design. In other words, it must show something more than mere
competition. This approach, once again, avoids conflict with the design patent
scheme because the trademark holder is required to make a particularized showing
of dilution by tarnishment or blurring, as well as to meet the other requirements of the
Dilution Act. Specifically, the trademark owner will be required to establish the fame
of its mark, that the mark is non-functional, and that the defendant's mark will cause
actually. None of these elements are prerequisites for recovery in a patent case.
In viewing the landscape of trademark and trade dress protection, there is a second
area of serious concern. Suppose a company obtains a design patent on a novel and
ornamental design feature of a product. The design might be the appearance of a
faucet, running shoe, or oven, to take three examples. During and - more importantly
- upon the expiration of the design patent's fourteen year term, the company asserts
that the ornamental design is also entitled to protection as trade dress under the
Lanham Act. Can the company ride both horses?
The analytical approach discussed here does not provide a complete resolution of
this question, in part because the problem involves the interplay between trademark
law and design patent law, rather than any inherent shortcoming in trademark law
itself. Presumably the company in question has developed a product configuration
that is sufficiently distinctive to quality for protection under design patent law; this
distinctive design will likely have acquired distinctiveness sufficient to satisfy
Samara's requirement of secondary meaning for product configurations. Similarly,
in order to obtain design (as opposed to utility) patent protection, the design must be
non-functional. 2 Thus, it would presumably be non-functional for purposes of
286. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (allowing design patent protection for new, original, nonobvious, and
ornamental designs); Avia Group Int'l. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(ornamental design of running shoes are non-functional and entitled to design patent protection).
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trademark law as well. Thus, any confusingly similar designs would theoretically be
actionable under trademark law, even upon the expiration of the patent.
There is some question regarding how frequently this scenario will occur,
particularly because design patents are relatively uncommon, difficult and costly to
obtain, and hard to enforce in light of the fact that they are often invalidated by the
courts. 7  Yet the possibility is quite real."' There are a number of possible
resolutions. One would be for the court to consider allowing relief under trademark
law, which would mean a form of potentially perpetual protection for the design
would subsist. The court would then have to consider whether such a result would
pose a conflict with statutory patent law (though not a "preemption" problem)'" or
a constitutional clash with the Patent and Copyright Clause's "limited times"
provision. Alternatively, the court could view the company as having elected to take
advantage of design patent protection and thus to have waived or implicitly
relinquished any trade dress protection for those features contained in its design
patent claims. Finally, the court could view trade dress protection as having been
forfeited as a result of the operation of the fundamental patent law tenet that the
claimed subject matter of an expired patent falls into the public domain. Under the
last approach, which seems to be the better one, those features that are part of the
design patent claim would fall into the public domain upon expiration of the design
patent, in accordance with traditional patent principles. This approach is also
consistent with the rule of statutory interpretation that constitutional conflicts should
be avoided when it is possible to interpret a statute to avoid the conflict.2'
V. CONCLUSION
The expansion in trademark law engendered by the Supreme Court's Two Pesos
decision and by Congress' enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act presents
serious challenges to trademark doctrine and theory. This article has suggested that
287. See Welkowitz, supra note 94, at 293-95 (summarizing problems with design patent
protection). For an illustration, see Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260,1263-64 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (upholding trademark claim as to design of line of furniture and noting that plaintiff had
abandoned design patent claim below in light of invalidity of patent).
288. Compare L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 117 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (upholding
design patent claim but overturning trade dress claim because of lack of likelihood of confusion).
289. Thus, the Supreme Court's decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964), Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) have no direct application. Indeed, the Court in Compco noted,
in finding state law preempted, that a design "can be copied at will" if it "is not entitled to a design patent
or other federal statutory protection." 376 U.S. at 158. See also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp.,
138 F.3d 277, 286 (7th Cir. 1998) (patent preemption cases have "no effect on the scope of federal
trademark or unfair competition law"); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 204 n.13 (3d Cit.
1995) (Lanham Act can protect trade dress, including product configurations, as preemption rules ofSears
and Compco are inapplicable to federal statutory claim); Ives Labs.hyp, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d
631,642 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The Court, it can be strongly argued, had no need to be concerned with marking
out the boundaries of a federal tort over which it had complete control and which Congress could contract
if the courts were pressing it further than that body desired.").
290. See Edward J. De Bartolo Corp. v. Florida GulfCoast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 577 (1988) (adopt fair interpretation of statute that avoids conflict).
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any solutions to these challenges must be grounded in the language of the Lanham
Act and the Dilution Act, in the framework the Court has adopted for trademarks in
Samara, Two Pesos, Qualitex, and Park 'N Fly, and in traditional trademark law and
policy.
Several interpretive principles can be derived from the statutes and from the
Supreme Court's decisions. First, there is little basis in the trademark statutes or in
trademark policy for legal rules that differentiate among various types of marks.
Thus, trade dress can be analyzed in the same manner as other marks, and may be
deemed to be inherently distinctive upon a proper showing by the trademark owner,
as the Court recognized in Two Pesos. Similarly, there is no basis for a per se rule
against trademarks for a color standing alone, as the Court concluded in Qualitex.
Although Samara indicates that color marks and product configurations cannot
qualify as inherently distinctive, this view can be seen in part as an empirical
assumption that colors and product configurations rarely, if ever, could be deemed
inherently distinctive. Second, the case law and statutory scheme of the Lanham Act
mandate that marks be categorized in accordance with their source-indicating
capacity. Although some have questioned whether courts must adhere strictly to the
Abercrombie "spectrum of distinctiveness," the Lanham Act itself requires all marks
to be classified in one of three outcome determinative ways. Marks that are generic
or functional are not entitled to trademark protection under any circumstances. This
fundamental rule preserves competition in the marketplace by insuring that all firms
have access to common terms that identify products or services themselves and to the
functional features of the products themselves. Marks that are descriptive are not
entitled to trademark protection unless they have attained secondary meaning. This
traditional trademark rule, particularly when combined with the fair use defense,
preserves the ability of firms to use descriptive terms unless they have come to signify
a source. Samara holds that product configurations should always be deemed to fall
into this category and must be shown to have secondary meaning in order to receive
protection. Finally, marks that are inherently distinctive are automatically eligible for
trademark protection. Providing immediate protection for these marks does not
hinder competition, as there is a potentially infinite number of such marks available,
and indeed Two Pesos recognized that such a rule may foster competition because
small businesses frequently do not have the resources to establish secondary meaning
in the short run.
By applying this framework to the trade dress and dilution fields, it is possible to
establish some boundaries for trademark protection. In the trade dress field, adoption
of this approach mandates that all trade dress claims, including those involving
product configurations, be scrutinized to assure that only non-functional aspects of
the product are given trademark protection. The functionality doctrine thus serves as
the line of demarcation between the trademark and utility patent spheres.
The second fundamental constraint on trade dress protection is the analysis of
distinctiveness that the Lanham Act mandates. Here, some courts and commentators
have suggested that trade dress generally or product configurations specifically
should be analyzed using a different framework than is used for other marks.
Although Samara endorses this approach as to product configurations, trade dress
generally is still governed by Two Pesos. Therefore, courts should attempt to make
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use of the Abercrombie categories, and in any case must determine if the trade dress
is (1) inherently distinctive (and automatically eligible for protection), (2) descriptive
(and protected only upon a showing of secondary meaning), or (3) generic or
functional (and hence ineligible for trademark protection under any circumstances).
Further, even though Samara precludes a finding of inherent distinctiveness in
product configuration cases, the distinctiveness inquiry must be done quite carefully
in these cases so as to avoid instances where a trademark owner is able to usurp
common features of a product design as trademarks. Such features should be
classified as generic and ineligible for trademark protection.
The third constraint on trade dress protection is that the plaintiff must show a
likelihood of consumer confusion in order to obtain relief. This requirement is
embedded in the common law background and statutory framework of the Lanham
Act, and most trade dress owners will not be able to claim protection under the
Dilution Act as they will probably be unable to make the requisite showing of fame.
Thus, a careful weighing of the likelihood of confusion factors is both necessary and
desirable. A common error that some courts make in assessing whether a consumer
confusion is likely is to give excessive weight to the defendant's "intentional"
copying of a mark. If the mark involved consists of a product configuration, courts
should be wary of assuming that imitation is undesirable. In particular, if a court has
erroneously found a product configuration to be source indicating (i.e., to have
secondary meaning) or where this conclusion is at least doubtful, then according too
much weight to this factor in the confusion analysis will lead to overprotection. In
the copyright context, the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. and
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises has cautioned against giving excessive weight
to any one factor in a fair use balancing test. Similarly, courts analyzing whether
there is a likelihood of confusion should take into account this cautionary note.
Samara recognizes that courts must beparticularly vigilant in protecting competition
in product configuration cases.
Trademark dilution requires a similar focus on statutory language and trademark
policy. Dilution law does indeed dramatically expand the scope of protection for
marks that qualify as famous under the Dilution Act. Although some courts and
commentators are reluctant to accord such protections, the courts are bound to do so
unless there is a sound constitutional or statutory basis on which to decline such
protection. The Dilution Act may turn out to be misguided, but this concern must be
addressed to Congress. Nonetheless, courts in some cases have failed to give
sufficient consideration to the limitations built into the Dilution Act itself. First,
Congress made it quite clear that only famous marks are eligible for protection under
the Act and established an eight-factor test for determining fame. In this respect, the
federal Dilution Act differs from at least some of state dilution statutes, and this
difference has great meaning. Unless the fame of a mark is clear and undisputed,
courts should engage in a careful analysis and balancing of these factors. Again, the
Court's copyright decisions in the fair use area provide some guidance, particularly
the admonitions in Campbell and Harper & Row that courts must engage in real
balancing of the statutory factors. By engaging in a careful analysis of whether a
mark is famous, courts can identify the relatively small class of marks that have
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particular recognition in the marketplace, which is the keystone for the Dilution Act's
expansive protections.
Second, the Act requires a showing of dilution. Most courts have not paid
sufficient attention to the implications of this statutory language, which is quite
different from the language of some of its state law counterparts. Requiring a
showing of actual dilution, as the statutory language mandates, rather than a
likelihood of dilution, as many courts have held, gives proper consideration to the
express language of the Dilution Act. It also serves as a way to cabin the tendency
of some courts to provide what appears to be protection for marks "in gross".
The framework suggested here provides further guidance with regard to the
controversial interplay between trade dress protection and the Dilution Act. Although
some have suggested that trade dress generally or product configurations in particular
are per se ineligible for the heightened protections that the Dilution Act accords to
famous marks, there is no basis for this conclusion in the language of either the
Lanham Act or the Dilution Act. This argument seems to contradict the fundamental
teaching of Two Pesos, which squarely rejected non-textual distinctions among
marks. Congress is capable of establishing carve-outs, as it did with various types of
descriptive marks, which are singled-out for analysis of secondary meaning. It is also
capable of establishing absolute bars to trademark registration, as it did for scandalous
or disparaging marks, flags, deceptive marks, and various other marks specifically
precluded from registration. As the Court found in Park 'N Fly, when Congress
identifies specific bases for challenging a mark, its omission of other grounds implies
something - that the omitted grounds are not a basis for challenge, or in this instance,
for differing treatment.
In order to receive protection under the Dilution Act, a product configuration must
be shown to be non-functional and distinctive (through acquired distinctiveness). As
has been suggested, these threshold inquiries should be made carefully. The mark
must then also be famous, which requires yet another level of scrutiny. As a practical
matter, if a competitor closely imitates the plaintiffs famous, source-identifying, and
non-functional product configuration, it is likely that the plaintiff will be able to
obtain relief under traditional trademark infringement doctrine. That is, the plaintiff
should be able to show a likelihood of confusion. Dilution theory serves to fill the
gap in the rare case where use of the plaintiffs famous mark does not cause
confusion, but does dilute the selling power of the famous mark. In the context of
product configurations, these cases will be rare indeed. They will typically involve
either a commercial use that tarnishes the famous mark, in which case there may be
no likelihood of confusion but there is most certainly dilution (and quite real harm to
the selling power of the mark), or a commercial use that in some other way dilutes the
mark or interferes with the trademark owner's control over the use of the mark's
selling power. These cases do not seem troubling as a matter of trademark policy,
and in any case they are quite clearly permitted by the statutory schemes of the
Lanham Act and Dilution Act.
What remains is the question whether providing product configurations with the
protections of the Dilution Act somehow conflicts with the policies of design patent
law or with the Constitution. The framework presented here suggests that no conflict
will be presented in the vast majority of cases. First, as most have recognized, a
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careful analysis of non-functionality and acquired distinctiveness should avoid any
conflict with federal policy as to utility patents. Second, in most cases in which the
product configuration has been found to be eligible for trademark protection, courts
can engage in the usual inquiry into the likelihood of consumer confusion. Although
some believe that even this form of protection is too similar to the rights provided
holders of design patents, the better argument is that there is no conflict in this realm,
as most courts and some commentators have concluded. Third, most product
configurations will not qualify for protection under the Dilution Act, but those few
famous ones that make the grade are entitled to its protections. Although some would
then look to the Supreme Court's patent preemption cases - Sears, Compco, and
Bonito Boats - as a basis for restricting or barring such claims, these cases speak only
indirectly to the question. Certainly there is nothing in their holdings that precludes
Congress, as opposed to the states, from providing protection for industrial designs.
Indeed, Bonito Boats explicitly recognized that this responsibility and power rests
with Congress. Although Congress has not enacted a specific industrial design statute
per se, it did enact the Trademark Dilution Act and made it applicable to all marks,
registered or unregistered, that qualify as famous.
Accordingly, there is no basis in trademark law or dilution law for precluding
protection against dilution for famous product configurations. If such a limit is to be
found, it must be based on avoidance of a conflict with patent policy in general, a
question for which Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats do provide general guidance,
or avoidance of a constitutional conflict with the "limited times" provision of the
Patent Clause. Both of these questions arise, however, if and only if the dilution
claim truly involves patent-like protection for famous product configurations. Most
cases will not involve such a claim, as they will involve some commercial use of the
mark that blurs the mark's selling power or tarnishes its reputation in the marketplace.
A careful showing of either of these elements should obviate any concern that the
court is providing patent-like protection to the plaintiff. This conclusion would hold
even if the plaintiff holds current or expired utility patents.
The only cases in which the issue is truly presented will be where the plaintiff
brings suit against a competitor but has failed to establish a likelihood of confusion
with regard to the defendant's imitation of its product configuration, or the case of
plaintiff that held an expired design patent and seeks to extend its monopoly through
trademark law. A complete resolution of these cases is beyond the scope of this
article, but courts certainly might seek to avoid a direct conflict with design patent
law or the Patent Clause by declining to provide protection in either instance. The
analysis presented here suggests that the first type of case will rarely take place, but
when it does it must be addressed with due regard to patent law and to the limits on
congressional power embodied in the Patent Clause. With regard to an expired design
patent, there is a strong argument that the plaintiff in such a situation should not be
entitled to continue to receive a monopoly on such a design once patent law has
dictated that it should fall into the public domain. Thus, to avoid a conflict with
express patent law and policy, courts can decline to provide protection in this case as
well.
Much of the scholarly commentary regarding trade dress and dilution theory has
been critical of the expansion of these doctrines. These arguments may have validity,
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but they quite simply reflect disagreement "with the balance struck by Congress in
determining the protection to be given," to borrow the Court's terminology in Park
'n Fly.29' Given the present state of trademark law, the constraints on trade dress and
dilution protection can and must come predominantly from the language and structure
of the statutory scheme and from the Lanham Act's common law foundations.
Congress is certainly free to reassess and modify the statutes at any time. Fortunately,
there already exists a sound theoretical and doctrinal basis for addressing most of the
boundary problems in trade dress and dilution cases. By focusing on the extent to
which the source-indicating capacity, informational value, and selling power of a
mark are truly implicated, courts can distinguish between legitimate competition and
impermissible free riding.
291. 469 U.S. at 201-02.
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